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FIGHTING CYBERCRIME AFTER UNITED
STATES V. JONES
DAVID GRAY,* DANIELLE KEATS CITRON**
& LIZ CLARK RINEHART***
In a landmark nondecision last term, five Justices of the United States
Supreme Court would have held that citizens possess a Fourth Amendment
right to expect that certain quantities of information about them will remain
private, even if they have no such expectations with respect to any of the
information or data constituting that whole. This quantitative approach to
evaluating and protecting Fourth Amendment rights is certainly novel and
raises serious conceptual, doctrinal, and practical challenges. In other
works, we have met these challenges by engaging in a careful analysis of
this “mosaic theory” and by proposing that courts focus on the
technologies that make collecting and aggregating large quantities of
information possible.
In those efforts, we focused on reasonable
expectations held by “the people” that they will not be subjected to broad
and indiscriminate surveillance. These expectations are anchored in
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Founding-era concerns about the capacity for unfettered search powers to
promote an authoritarian surveillance state. Although we also readily
acknowledged that there are legitimate and competing governmental and
law enforcement interests at stake in the deployment and use of surveillance
technologies that implicate reasonable interests in quantitative privacy, we
did little more. In this Article, we begin to address that omission by
focusing on the legitimate governmental and law enforcement interests at
stake in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting cyberharassment and
healthcare fraud.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Until the middle of the October 2011 Term, the prevailing view on
how to measure Fourth Amendment interests and where to draw the line
between subconstitutional surveillance and a Fourth Amendment “search”
focused on identifying “reasonable expectations of privacy.”2 If law
enforcement officers did not enter private spaces, intrude on private
interactions, or otherwise invade a defendant’s subjectively manifested and
objectively reasonable expectations of privacy, then they were left to pursue
their investigations unfettered by Fourth Amendment constraints or
concerns. Even if an investigative method or strategy did invade a person’s
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Fourth Amendment did not bar law
enforcement officers from using it. Rather, the Fourth Amendment
required that law enforcement’s discretion be limited to ensure a reasonable
balance between the government’s interests and the privacy interests of
those subject to search.
Until relatively recently, the contours of reasonable expectations of
privacy, as well as the balance between law enforcement’s interests and
those of the individual, were fairly stable. In United States v. Jones3 the
Court indicated that the ground has begun to shift. As we have become
more dependent on networked devices and as public spaces are increasingly
tracked and traced, we expose more of ourselves to governmental actors and
to third parties. As Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones, the government, by
itself and through its contracted agents, now has access to powerful
surveillance technologies and sophisticated software that is capable of
aggregating and analyzing massive quantities of data.4 For the most part,
this literally occurs in bits and bytes that mean little when considered
discretely. When aggregated together, however, these isolated events
produce a revealing and disconcertingly vivid picture of our lives.5
1

U.S. CONST. amend IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
4 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
5 See David Gray & Danielle Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2013) (observing that “although a collection of dots is sometimes nothing more
than a collection of dots, some collections of dots, when assessed holistically, are A Sunday
Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte”).
2
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Although Jones was resolved on narrow grounds, five Justices took the
opportunity to suggest that these new surveillance capacities give law
enforcement access to revealing informational mosaics that violate
reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore implicate the Fourth
Amendment. This “mosaic theory” of Fourth Amendment privacy is novel
and will pose serious challenges for law enforcement officials, citizens, and
courts if it is ultimately adopted.6 Meeting these challenges will require, at
a minimum, understanding both the privacy interests and the legitimate
governmental interests at stake.
The concurring Justices in Jones, joined by academic commentators,7
have described at length the privacy interests implicated by technologies
capable of gathering large quantities of data. Almost absent from the
discussion so far, however, has been any accounting of the legitimate
governmental and law enforcement interests served by these technologies.
That is unfortunate. After all, it is hard to strike a reasonable balance
between the competing interests of law enforcement and citizen privacy, as
the Fourth Amendment requires, if we lack a clear understanding of those
competing interests. Our goal in this Article is to begin filling that void by
discussing the role of data aggregation and surveillance technologies in the
detection, investigation, and prosecution of cybercrimes.
The social problems constituting “cybercrime” are varied and costly.
Take for example cyberharassment, which involves patterns of online
behavior that are intended to inflict substantial emotional distress and
would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.8
Multifaceted and malleable, “[c]yber harassment . . . tend[s] to involve
explicit or implicit threats, privacy invasions, defamation, data thefts,
impersonation, technological attacks, and[] the recruitment of third parties
to physically harm victims.”9 Attackers hack into victims’ computers to
steal revealing pictures and then extort them, threatening to release the
pictures unless they agree to the harassers’ demands.10 Vengeful ex-lovers
6

For an in-depth discussion of the challenges, see id.
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
P UB. P OL’Y 1 (2012); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2228919.
8 D ANIELLE K EATS C ITRON , H ATE 3.0: THE R ISE OF D ISCRIMINATORY O NLINE
HARASSMENT AND H OW TO S TOP IT (forthcoming 2014). We include under this umbrella
cyberstalking, which tends to have a more narrow definition—repeated online behavior, with
intent to cause fear of bodily harm—as well as other forms of cyberharassment, including
cyberextortion and other related offenses.
9 Id.
10 Another related cybercrime involves data theft. Harassers may hack into victims’
7

2013]

FIGHTING CYBERCRIME

749

post victims’ naked pictures on pornography sites alongside the suggestion
that they are interested in anonymous sex.11 Although some attackers
confine their hostile activities to networked technologies, others use all
available tools to harass victims, including real-space stalking.12
Cyberharassment has a profound impact on victims’ lives. It causes
debilitating psychological and emotional harm. It damages victims’ careers
and professional reputations. It interferes with their educations.13 It
silences them, discouraging them from on- and offline pursuits. In addition
to psychological, emotional, and social damage, cyberharassment has led to
sexual assaults, which are sometimes committed by unwitting third
parties.14
Although fraud predates the computer by millennia, healthcare fraud
provides an example of a traditional crime that has been upgraded and
enhanced by new computer and Internet technologies. According to
conservative estimates, approximately $60 billion in annual Medicare
payments are fraudulent.15 In sharp contrast, current efforts to prevent,
computers to steal their intimate images; crime rings use malware to harvest personal data
and trade secrets from infected computers. The information is used to perpetrate identity
theft, extortion, and industrial espionage. Steve Towns, Strength in Numbers, GOV’T TECH .
M AG., Oct. 2012, at 18; Stephen Cobb, Industrial Crimeware Sets a Blistering Pace, SC
M AG. (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.scmagazine.com/industrial-crimeware-sets-a-blisteringpace/article/255601/.
11 See United States v. Rose, 315 F.3d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Rose did in fact post
pictures of [his victim’s] children, along with their full names, address, and telephone
number, on web sites soliciting sexual activity.”); see also United States v. Sayer, Nos. 2:11CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 1714746, at *2 (D. Me. May 15, 2012)
(explaining that in addition to uploading pornographic materials and the contact information
of his victim, the stalker posted ads in her name “invit[ing] men to come to her home for
sexual encounters”) (citations omitted). Examples of “revenge porn” sites include Nik
Richie’s THE DIRTY.COM, which includes explicit posts like The Dirtiest B*tch in Baltimore,
THE DIRTY (July 20, 2011), http://thedirty.com/2011/07/the-dirtiest-btch-in-baltimore/, and
Hunter Moore’s upcoming website HUNTERMOORE.TV, http://www.huntermoore.tv/, which
is predicted to be a revival of his now-defunct ISANYONEUP.COM. Kashmir Hill, Hunter
Moore Will Post Your Nude Photos but Will Only Include Your Home Address if He Thinks
You’re a Horrible Person, FORBES.COM (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill/2012/12/05/hunter-moore-is-going-to-start-posting-your-nude-photos-again-butwill-only-post-your-home-address-if-he-thinks-youre-a-horrible-person/.
12 WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE, COMPARISON STATISTICS 2000–2012, at 3 (2012),
available at www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2012.pdf.
13 C ITRON , supra note 8; Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. R EV . 61,
71–73 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 M ICH. L. R EV. 373, 382 (2009).
14 See DeeDee Correll, Craigslist Implicated in Rape Case: A Wyoming Man is Accused
of Using the Website to Engineer an Ex-Girlfriend’s Assault, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, at
A9.
15 Kelli Kennedy, U.S. Charges More than 100 in Wide Medicare Fraud Bust, WASH.
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detect, and prosecute healthcare fraud have produced only modest returns,
recovering only $4.1 billion in 2011.16 In addition to monetary costs,
healthcare fraud also directly threatens the safety of patients, particularly
when schemes result in unnecessary treatments, withholding necessary
treatments, or disbursement of improper prescriptions.
There can be no doubt that the government has a compelling interest in
detecting and prosecuting cybercrimes like cyberharassment and healthcare
fraud. New and developing surveillance technologies, particularly those
involving data aggregation and analysis, offer law enforcement officers
helpful tools for combating these crimes. At the same time, these
technologies implicate privacy interests that would be given Fourth
Amendment status under a mosaic theory. In this Article, we explore these
competing interests and outline ways that courts, legislatures, and
executives might strike a reasonable balance between them. Part II
provides a brief historical account of the relevant Fourth Amendment
doctrine to put the mosaic theory in context and to explain the challenges it
raises for identifying and balancing competing privacy and law enforcement
interests. Part III focuses on the government’s interest in preventing,
detecting, and prosecuting healthcare fraud. Part IV elaborates on the
government’s significant interests in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting
cyberharassment crimes. Part V concludes.
II. UNITED STATES V. JONES AND THE MOSAIC THEORY OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
To understand the new law enforcement dynamic set to take hold in
cybercrime investigations and prosecutions, it is necessary to have a clear
understanding of both the balancing test at the core of the Fourth
Amendment and how the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy may
put a thumb on that scale. That is the project for this Part.
As Akhil Amar has explored, agents conducting searches under state
authority were subject to civil actions long before 1791.17 The Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures draws on
this common law history.18 In fact, for the better part of a century after it
was ratified, the Fourth Amendment appears to have been understood
largely as a constitutional instantiation of property rights developed and

POST, Feb. 18, 2011, at A3.
16
About Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/index.html (last visited May 21, 2013).
17 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786
(1994).
18 Slobogin, supra note 7, at 12.
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bundled through the common law of trespass.19 So much so, in fact, that
the prevalent remedy for Fourth Amendment violations until Boyd v. United
States20 was an action in tort.21
A trespass-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment may well
have served the expectations of those who read the text in 1791. By the
early years of the twentieth century, however, limiting the reach of the
Fourth Amendment to physical incursions in protected places seemed
inadequate. First, shifts in population from the farm to the city, coupled
with the expansion of professionalized police forces, made routine, but
nevertheless invasive, engagements with law enforcement far more
common than our forebears living at the turn of the nineteenth century
could have imagined.22 Second, new technologies and their corresponding
social expectations began to stretch common law concepts developed in the
19

See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (“The well known
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of
assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s house, his person,
his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will.”). Orin Kerr has
questioned this traditional understanding in a recent essay. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious
History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154611 [hereinafter Kerr, Curious
History]. Without delving too far, we see less space between Professor Kerr’s account and
the orthodox view than he does. Although the Supreme Court often cited citizens’ privacy
interests in many of its pre-Katz cases, these interests were clearly tied to property. This is
no surprise. After all, the common law has long understood property as a bundle of rights
that can be variously acquired and alienated. These include the rights to exclude, to peaceful
enjoyment, and to private use. Thus, as Professor Kerr himself has noted, the vast bulk of
the Court’s post-Katz cases have, in fact, focused on the privacy protections that citizens
have in certain “places.” See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 316–17 (2012) [hereinafter Kerr, Mosaic].
20 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
21 See Amar, supra note 17, at 774, 785–91; David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur:
The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence,
50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 19), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2200&context=fac_p
ubs [hereinafter Gray, Spectacular Non Sequitur]; see also David Gray et al., The Supreme
Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 8–9 (2012) [hereinafter
Gray, Contemporary Silver Platter]; William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 808 (2000); Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372–77 (1983).
Roger Roots recently has disputed this common wisdom. See Roger Roots, The Originalist
Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2009–2010).
22 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The
Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 460–61
(2010); see also DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE UNDERWORLD 4–9, 29–40 (1979)
(describing how urbanization was a catalyst for the development of a modern police force
and new investigative techniques).

752

DAVID GRAY ET AL.

[Vol. 103

context of cases involving physical intrusions into spaces traditionally
protected by the common law of trespass.23
The facts of Olmstead v. United States24 provide a useful example. A
year after Bell and Watson’s famous first telephonically transmitted words,
there were 3,000 telephones in service in the United States.25 The first
coast-to-coast telephone line was completed in 1915.26 Public telephones
made their debut in the early 1880s, but took off after William Gray’s
invention of the coin-operated telephone in 1889.27 In 1904, there were 3.3
million telephones in service in the United States.28 Four years later, New
York City alone had over 800,000 telephones.29 By the time the “French
phone” made its first appearance on the American market and AT&T
opened the first transatlantic telephone service in 1927, the telephone had
become a ubiquitous feature of American life.30 As with all libertyenhancing technologies, the telephone was also vulnerable to perversion in
the hands of criminals. Where this occurred, law enforcement officers had
a natural desire to listen in.
In Olmstead, law enforcement officers investigating a conspiracy to
import and distribute intoxicating liquors “tapped” telephone lines using a
crude version of today’s surveillance tools: “[s]mall wires [that] were
inserted along the ordinary telephone wires.”31 “The[se] insertions were
made without trespass upon any property of the defendants.”32 Via these
23

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Oliver, supra note 22, at 460–

61.
24

277 U.S. at 438.
Telephone History: The Early Years 1876–1900, TELEPHONY MUSEUM
http://www.telephonymuseum.com/telephone history.htm (last visited May 21, 2013); see
also TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 9–32
(2010).
26 Telephone
History: The New Century 1901–1940, TELEPHONY MUSEUM,
http://www.telephonymuseum.com/History 1901-1940.htm (last visited May 21, 2013); see
also WU, supra note 25.
27 Sheldon Hochheiser, Public Telephones, IEEE USA TODAY’S ENGINEER (July 2009),
http://www.todaysengineer.org/2009/jul/history.asp (last visited May 21, 2013); see also
WU, supra note 25.
28 A Brief History: Origins, AT&T, http://www.corp.att.com/history/history1.html (last
visited May 21, 2013); see also WU, supra note 25.
29 HERBERT N. CASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 172–73 (1910), available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=CasTele.sgm&images=images/modeng&
data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=5&division=div1; see also WU, supra
note 25.
30
See, e.g., CLAUDE S. FISHER, AMERICA CALLING: SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE
TO 1940, at 52–53 (1992); Getting the Radio News by Telephone, 43 POPULAR MECHANIC
636, 636–38 (1925); Hello London!, 47 POPULAR MECHANIC 353, 353–54 (1927).
31 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928).
32 Id. at 457.
25
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taps, the officers were surreptitiously able to listen to and record
conversations among the conspirators, which allowed them to gather critical
information about the conspiracy and to direct and target their interventions
with maximum efficiency and safety. Based in part on information
gathered through, or as a consequence of, these wiretaps, Olmstead and his
confederates were prosecuted and convicted for a range of Prohibitionrelated offenses. Olmstead appealed, alleging that the installation and use
of the wiretaps violated his Fourth Amendment rights. On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, the absence of any physical trespass turned
out to be determinative.
Writing for the majority in Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft found that all
of the Court’s prior Fourth Amendment decisions entailed either an “actual
entrance into private quarters” or “the taking of something tangible.”33
Furthermore, he pointed out, the Amendment’s enumeration of “persons,
houses, papers, and effects,” along with its requirement that warrants
specify “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,”
limited the scope of its protections to “material things.”34 Because the
surveillance technique employed by the officers in Olmstead did not entail a
physical trespass, Chief Justice Taft saw no search or seizure.35 Rather, in
light of the fact that “[t]he evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing, and that only,”36 the Court held that the “the wiretapping here
disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”37 Although Chief Justice Taft invited legislative
intervention to set limits on law enforcement’s use of wiretapping
technologies,38 he could see no constitutional authority for the Court to
intervene in the absence of a physical trespass.39
In a prescient dissent from the majority opinion in Olmstead, Justice
Brandeis argued that limiting Fourth Amendment protections to the
compass of common law trespass failed to provide adequate protections for

33

Id. at 457–64.
Id. at 464.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 466.
38 The wiretapping at issue in Olmstead was conducted in violation of state law. Id. at
468–69. Over Justice Holmes’s protest, id. at 470, however, the Olmstead majority
maintained that state law could not dictate rules of evidence governing federal courts. Id. at
469.
39 Id. at 465–66. Of course, that legislation was long in coming. It was not until 1968,
after the Court abandoned the underlying rationale of Olmstead in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), that Congress finally stepped in, passing the Wiretap Act and then the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
34
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citizens at the dawn of a new technological age.40 Although he
acknowledged the Fourth Amendment’s historical focus on physical
trespass, Justice Brandeis argued that “a principle, to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”41
Although “force and violence” had until then been a prerequisite for
constitutional engagement, Justice Brandeis observed that “[s]ubtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have [since] become available
to the Government.”42 Furthermore, he predicted that this trend would
continue.43 In the face of increasing hostility to privacy, Justice Brandeis
refused to accept the majority’s view that the Fourth Amendment had no
say with regard to law enforcement’s use of expanding surveillance
capacities in ways that could threaten “the most comprehensive of rights,
and the right most valued by civilized men”: “the right to be let alone.”44
In the years after Olmstead, many of Justice Brandeis’s predictions
about the expansion of government surveillance came to pass, and his views
40

277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’s dissent came as no
surprise to students of his groundbreaking article, The Right to Privacy, 4 H ARV . L. REV .
193 (1890), which he cowrote with Samuel Warren. Justice Holmes joined Justice
Brandeis’s decision in Olmstead, but wrote separately to emphasize his view—maintained
since at least Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)—that federal
courts should not be in the business of sanctioning criminal conduct by law enforcement
officers by admitting into evidence the products of illegal conduct. See Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to
the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious.
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law, the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.”). For
an extended explanation of Justice Holmes’s view in the context of the Court’s broader
exclusionary rule jurisprudence, see Gray, Spectacular Non Sequitur, supra note 21.
41 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 474 (“The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by
which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. ‘That places the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer’ was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To
Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed ‘subversive of all the comforts of society.’
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?”) (footnotes omitted).
44 Id. at 478.
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on the Fourth Amendment’s reach slowly took hold. The Court famously
took stock of these shifts in Katz v. United States.45 There, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation suspected that Mr. Katz was conducting an illegal
bookmaking operation using a public telephone booth.46 To gather
evidence against him, agents attached an electronic listening device to the
outside of the booth. Using that “electronic ear,” they overheard and
recorded incriminating statements that Katz made to his clients and
associates, which otherwise would have been kept private within the
confines of the booth.
There is no doubt that what the agents did in Katz constituted
eavesdropping. Given the Court’s holding in Olmstead, they must
nevertheless have been quite confident in the constitutionality of their
surveillance.47 After all, Olmstead made clear that, absent a property
interest and physical intrusion, the Fourth Amendment imposed no
constraints on law enforcement conduct.48 Because the phone booth in
question was a public resource, Katz could not claim any property interest
in it. Moreover, even if he could claim a property interest in the booth, the
device was attached to the outside of the booth and thus its installation and
use did not entail a physical invasion. By application of modus tollens to
premises set forth by the Court in Olmstead, it therefore appeared that the
agents’ use of an electronic device to listen surreptitiously to and record Mr.
Katz’s conversations in that booth was not a “search” or “seizure” subject to
Fourth Amendment regulation.
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, held that Katz’s
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. Citing a line of cases since
Olmstead and the increasing ubiquity of telephone communications,49
Justice Stewart found that “the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there

45

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 354.
47 Id. at 352 (“The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this
case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique
they employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls.”).
48 Id. at 352–53 (noting that “a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside
the ambit of the Constitution”).
49 Id. at 352 (“[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”).
46
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enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”50 Rather, he wrote,
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”51 Instead of focusing
on an individual’s property interests, the Court turned its attention to what
Justice Harlan referred to as Katz’s “constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy.”52 With those expectations in focus, the Court
found that: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . .
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.”53 Noting that Katz had closed
the door of the phone booth with the reasonable expectation that his
conversations would not be accessible to the public,54 the Court held that
“[t]he Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording
[Katz’s] words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”55 “The fact that the electronic
device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of
the booth,” Justice Stewart concluded, “can have no constitutional
significance.”56
Katz marked a significant shift in Fourth Amendment analysis and
doctrine. The threshold questions in any Fourth Amendment case are
whether there has been a “search” or a “seizure,” and whether the litigant at
bar has “standing” to assert a violation. After Katz, the answer to both
questions has been a function of whether the person alleging a Fourth
Amendment violation has subjectively manifested an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.57 Unsurprisingly, the
answer depends on the context. There are, nevertheless, some broad and
important rules. For example, the Court has time and again defended as
reasonable the expectations of privacy that we have in our homes, persons,
and immediate possessions.58 That is, despite its protestations in Katz that
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”59 much of the Court’s
50

Id. at 353.
Id. at 351.
52 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
54 Id. at 352 (“The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the
petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he
entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude
when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”).
55
Id. at 353.
56 Id.
57 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
58 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
59 389 U.S. at 351.
51
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post-Katz jurisprudence has in one way or another been about charting the
social geography of public and private spaces—a journey that often is
difficult to navigate.60 Adding to the difficulties, the territory it has mapped
is not composed entirely of mountains and valleys. Rather, we find, there is
a range of spaces in between, including cars61 and businesses,62 where we
enjoy “diminished” expectations of privacy.
The impact of Katz on Fourth Amendment law is not limited to
assessing these threshold questions of search, seizure, and standing. The
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit searches and seizures, after all, but
rather prohibits only “unreasonable” searches and seizures. By linking the
Fourth Amendment to reasonable expectations of privacy rather than
property rights, Katz provided a ready analytical structure for evaluating
whether a search or seizure is “reasonable” that asks courts to strike a
balance between the competing interests of law enforcement and citizens.63
So, for example, a search conducted under the authority of a warrant issued
by a detached and neutral magistrate, based on facts sufficient to provide
probable cause to believe that specified evidence will be found in a
particular home at an appointed time, is “reasonable” because the
combination of grounded suspicion, judicial review, and particularity
strikes a reasonable balance between law enforcement interests in detecting
and prosecuting crime and the target’s reasonable expectations of privacy in
his home.64 This warrant requirement also imposes broad constraints on
law enforcement’s authority to search our homes generally, thereby
guaranteeing a reasonable degree of security for all of us. Similarly, the
general requirement that officers “knock and announce” before conducting
a warranted search reflects a reasonable balance between law enforcement’s
interests in self-protection and preserving evidence on the one hand, and the
privacy, safety, and property interests of people on the premises at the time
on the other.65
The general approach of assessing Fourth Amendment search, seizure,
standing, and reasonableness by focusing on competing interests of citizens
and law enforcement has produced a series of important doctrines. Two are
paramount for present purposes: the public-observation doctrine and the
third-party doctrine. The public-observation doctrine holds that law
60

See Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 19.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 305 (1999).
62 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967).
63
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”).
64 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948).
65 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934–36 (1995).
61
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enforcement can freely make observations from any place where they
lawfully have a right to be.66 The rationale underlying this rule derives
directly from Katz, where the Court maintained that we have no reason to
expect privacy in activities “knowingly expose[d] to the public.”67 Because
observations made from a public place do not implicate citizens’ reasonable
expectations of privacy, law enforcement officers have unfettered discretion
to pursue their interests in detecting and prosecuting crime by any means
that is analogous—from a Katz point of view—to standing on a street
corner. Applying the public-observation doctrine, the Court has held that
police may rummage through garbage cans set out for collection,68 look
down into our yards from public airspace,69 and monitor our comings and
goings on public roads,70 without the need for a warrant or other judicial
review. That is because, in theory at least, any member of the public could
do the same; therefore, no reasonable expectations of privacy need to be
considered.
The third-party doctrine holds, in essence, that the only way to keep a
secret is not to tell anyone. It suggests that people should reasonably expect
that anytime they share information with a confidant they run the risk that
the information will be shared with others. When this occurs, we can
complain about breaches of trust by our erstwhile confidants, but not about
those with whom the information has been shared. Following similar logic,
the Court has ruled that the Fourth Amendment cannot save us from illplaced trust if those with whom we share private information pass it along
to law enforcement.71 Applying this rule, the Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the government from using lawful means to
gain access to privately recorded conversations,72 “pen registers” of
telephone calls kept by telephone companies,73 or lists of financial
transactions kept by financial institutions.74 Here again, law enforcement’s
discretion to gather and use information from third parties is not constrained
by the Fourth Amendment because there are no competing privacy interests
that require accommodation.75

66

See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
68 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
69 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986).
70 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
71 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
72
Id. at 749–50.
73 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
74 California Banker’s Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974).
75 The limited reach of the Fourth Amendment does not bar the political branches from
setting limits on the flow of information from third parties to law enforcement. In fact,
67
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As we shall see in Parts III and IV, the public-observation and the
third-party doctrines play a critical role in law enforcement’s efforts to
detect and prosecute many crimes, particularly cybercrimes. That is
important because these doctrines appear to be under threat after the Court’s
decision in United States v. Jones.
In Jones, an interagency group of law enforcement officers associated
with an FBI–Metropolitan Police Department Task Force was investigating
Lawrence Maynard and Antoine Jones on suspicion that they were part of a
conspiracy to import, process, and distribute narcotics in and around the
District of Columbia.76 During the course of their investigation, officers
obtained warrants to tap Jones’s and Maynard’s phones as well as a warrant
that permitted them to install and monitor a GPS-enabled tracking device on
Jones’s automobile.77 Surveillance conducted over the next four weeks
using the wiretap and the GPS device was productive, providing
investigators with several incriminating statements and over 2,000 pages of
information documenting Jones’s regular visits to stash houses and other
locations tied to the broader drug conspiracy.78
At trial, Jones moved to suppress evidence gathered using the GPSenabled tracking device. His principal argument was that the officers failed
to abide by the terms of the warrant.79 Relying on the public-observation
doctrine, the trial court denied Jones’s motion. The vast majority of what
the GPS device gathered was information documenting Jones’s travels over
public roads.80 Because this was information that he knowingly revealed to
the public, the court reasoned that Jones lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Although the officers had violated the terms of their warrant when
installing the GPS device, the court ruled that no warrant was required in
the first place because the surveillance conducted using the device did not
implicate any of the privacy interests that the warrant requirement is
designed to accommodate.81 That the officers violated the terms of the
Congress has passed laws protecting financial information shared with banks, phone records,
and even video rental histories. Existing Federal Privacy Laws, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECH., https://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/protect/laws.php (last visited May 21, 2013). The
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments limit law enforcement’s ability to obtain coerced
confessions that defendants admitted to third parties. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
288 (1991).
76 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79
Id. The warrant required that the device be installed within ten days, but it was
installed on the eleventh day. The warrant also required that the device be installed within
the borders of the District of Columbia, but it was installed in a Maryland parking lot.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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warrant was therefore of no constitutional consequence.
The trial court’s reasoning in Jones was well-grounded in post-Katz
doctrine, particularly the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Knotts.82
There, the Court was asked to determine whether law
enforcement’s use of a radio beeper tracking device to monitor the public
movements of a suspect under investigation for alleged participation in a
drug conspiracy constituted a “search” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.83 Affirming its commitment to the public-observation
doctrine, the Court held that it did not.84 Although the beeper device
allowed the officers in Knotts to track their suspect over city streets, even
after they lost visual contact, the Court found that “scientific enhancement
of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would
not also raise,” which is to say it raises none at all.85 The factual parallels
between the two cases appeared to the trial court in Jones to put the
question before it on all fours with the holding in Knotts.86 Although the
GPS-enabled tracking device used in Jones provided more precise
information and required less human engagement than the radio beeper
device used in Knotts, the information revealed was the same: movements
knowingly exposed to public view, to which, the court concluded, Jones
had no more reasonable claim of privacy than did Knotts.
Based in part on the information generated using the GPS-enabled
tracking device, Jones was convicted.87 He appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where he found a
sympathetic audience for his Fourth Amendment concerns.88 Writing for a
three-judge panel, Judge Ginsburg focused not on the nature of the GPS
surveillance, or the precise type of information gathered at any given
moment, but instead on the length of the surveillance and the quantity of
information gathered by law enforcement using the GPS-enabled tracking
device.89 Distinguishing Knotts, Judge Ginsburg explained that “a person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares [may have] no

82

460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 277.
84 Id. at 285 (“We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of our inquiry in
discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the beeper signals complained of by respondent
invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part? For the reasons previously stated,
we hold it did not. Since it did not, there was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
85
Id. at 285.
86 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
87 Id. at 949.
88 Id.
89 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
83
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reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another,” but that does not mean that he “has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end.”90 Rather, the
court argued, he retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of
his movements over an extended period of time to the extent that the
aggregate of those moments reveals “an intimate picture of his life.”91
Drawing specific links to the Katz framework, Judge Ginsburg argued
that “the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not
actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe
all those movements is effectively nil.”92 Relying on this “mosaic theory”
of Fourth Amendment privacy, the circuit court therefore held that Jones
had a “[reasonable] expectation of privacy in his movements over the
course of a month,” even if he had no such expectation of privacy in the
constitutive particulars.93 Because the officers who installed and monitored
the GPS device gathered information on Jones’s movements for nearly a
month, and without lawful authority of a warrant issued on probable cause
by a detached and neutral magistrate, the court vacated Jones’s conviction.
Much to the surprise of many Court watchers, the Supreme Court
affirmed.94 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia deferred
consideration of the circuit court’s mosaic theory95 and focused instead on
the installation of the GPS device on Jones’s car. In the majority’s view,
merely installing the device constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment, not because it violated subjectively manifested expectations of
90

Id. at 557.
Id. at 562; see also id. at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree, but of kind, for no
single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the
life and a way of life, nor the departure from a routine that, like the dog that did not bark in
the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal even more.”); id. at 563 (“[P]rolonged GPS
monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have—
short perhaps of his spouse.”).
92 Id. at 558; see also id. at 563 (“A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor
and retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination,
and each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those
movements to remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’”) (citation omitted). In an analogous
way, state harassment laws and privacy tort law have reinforced the notion that people can
expect to be free from unreasonable surveillance. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986,
998–99 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding injunction of a persistent paparazzo); Wolfson v. Lewis,
924 F. Supp. 1413, 1420, 1433–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (enjoining surveillance of a family on the
grounds it was part of “a persistent course of hounding, harassment and unreasonable
surveillance, even if conducted in a public or semi-public place”).
93
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
94 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
95 Id. (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where
a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there
is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”).
91
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privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, but because it
entailed a trespass for the purpose of obtaining information.96 Surveying
major Fourth Amendment cases since Katz, Justice Scalia found the
reported death of the trespass principles underlying Olmstead 97 were
exaggerated.98 Rather than displacing the traditional trespass approach to
the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia found that the Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test was an edifice built upon common law
foundations.99 Although it was necessary to appeal to those additional
protections in Katz, and to chart the limits of those extensions in cases like
Knotts, the facts before the Court in Jones simply did not require anything
more than a trespass analysis.100 Because the officers trespassed upon
Jones’s property for the purpose of obtaining information, the Court held
that they engaged in a search.101 Because that search was neither authorized
by a warrant nor otherwise justified by established standards of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness, the majority sustained the circuit court’s
judgment, if not its holding.102
The Jones majority’s revitalization of the trespass approach to defining
Fourth Amendment search and seizure was headline-worthy by itself, but
the front-page stories came from the two concurring opinions, which
together represent the views of a voting majority of five Justices.
Although she joined the majority, Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate
concurrence in Jones to express her broad sympathies for the privacy
interests that would be afforded Fourth Amendment protection by the
circuit court’s mosaic theory.103 As she explained, long-term GPS
monitoring, such as was conducted in Jones, “generates a precise,
96 Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hen the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally
protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment . . . .”). Judge Kavanaugh proposed trespass as a narrower ground for
decision in his dissent from the circuit court’s denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.
See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–71 (2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
97 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that the underpinnings
of Olmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”).
98 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–54. We allude here to Mark Twain’s famous comments on
newspaper reports of his death.
99 Id. at 952 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
100 Id. at 954.
101
Id. at 949 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
102 Id. at 954.
103 Id. at 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth
of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”104 In addition to its power, Justice Sotomayor noted that GPS
monitoring comes “at a relatively low cost,” and that leaving the
Government with “unfettered discretion” to track whomever it chooses is a
recipe for abuse.105 Under such a regime of constant surveillance, Justice
Sotomayor worried that the reality, or the threat, “that the Government may
be watching [would] chill[] associational and expressive freedoms,” and
“alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society.”106
Justice Sotomayor acknowledged, as did the circuit court, that
adopting the mosaic theory would require abandoning or modifying the
public-observation doctrine.107 She went further, however, by suggesting
that implementing the mosaic theory might also require the Court to
“reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”108 According
to Justice Sotomayor, the third-party doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”109 In particular,
“[p]eople disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries,
and medications they purchase to online retailers.”110 Attaching her
concerns to the Katz framework, Justice Sotomayor concluded:
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure
to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or
month, or year.
But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases
to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.111

In a separate concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Kagan, Justice Alito also expressed significant sympathy for the circuit
court’s mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.112 Like Justice
Sotomayor, Justice Alito simply could not see why the public-observation
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 955.
Id. at 956.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 957.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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doctrine should survive without significant modification given the
government’s dramatically expanded surveillance capacities. “In the precomputer age,” he notes, “the greatest protections of privacy were neither
constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”113 It was nearly impossible, or at
least prohibitively expensive, for law enforcement to engage in the kind of
continuous, long-term surveillance to which Jones was subjected.114 We
could therefore rest assured that the government was not watching all of us
constantly, or even very many of us at any given time.115 Justice Alito
therefore would have held that “short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our
society has recognized as reasonable,” but that “longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.”116
Together, the concurring opinions in Jones represent a majority of
sitting Justices who appear to be willing to adopt some version of the
mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy. Doing so would, as these
Justices recognize, require abandoning or modifying both the publicobservation doctrine and the third-party doctrine.117 This possibility has
sent tremors through the community of those interested in Fourth
Amendment issues, including law enforcement officers. That is because
many widely used, and often critical, investigative technologies, methods,
and strategies that have until now operated outside of Fourth Amendment
regulations may soon be subject to Fourth Amendment controls. Although
the Fourth Amendment would not necessarily bar GPS tracking and other
surveillance technologies, methods, and strategies that implicate reasonable
expectations of privacy in informational mosaics, it will impose limits on
their use by requiring courts to balance the competing interests of law
enforcement in detecting and prosecuting crime, and citizens’ interests in
privacy.118 As we look towards that future, it is important to have a clear
113

Id. at 963.
Id. at 964; see also Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 455–56 (2007).
115 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Hutchins,
supra note 114, at 455–56.
116 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Stephen E.
Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth
Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 547–48 (2005).
117 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment).
118 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that long-term use of GPSenabled tracking technology would require a warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate based upon probable cause); Jason M. Weinstein, Public Safety and Online
Privacy—Myth Versus Reality, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33, 38–39 (2013).
114
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understanding of what those competing interests are.
The Jones
concurrences, and their cadres of supporters, have done a great deal to focus
attention on the privacy interests that would sit on one side of that scale.119
The counterbalancing governmental interests at stake have received far less
attention, however. This is particularly true for many cybercrimes, which
are relatively new, increasingly complex, and often unfamiliar to citizens
who have not been victims. In the next two Parts, we begin to remedy that
omission by highlighting the significant law enforcement interests at stake
in healthcare fraud and cyberharassment.
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN PREVENTING,
DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING HEALTHCARE FRAUD
Should the Court eventually hold that citizens have reasonable
expectations of privacy in mosaics of personal information, it will then need
to provide some guidance to law enforcement, legislatures, and lower courts
on the impact of the mosaic theory on the Court’s core Fourth Amendment
balancing test and on well-settled doctrinal rules like the public-observation
doctrine and the third-party doctrine. In this Part, we explore the role that
investigative techniques and technologies that are likely to trigger mosaic
theory concerns play in advancing legitimate governmental interests in
preventing, detecting, and prosecuting healthcare fraud.
A. BIG DATA AND THE MOSAIC THEORY

Data-collection capabilities are increasing at an unprecedented rate.120
Not surprisingly, government agencies that investigate criminal offenses
seek as much access to data as possible. Cell phone carriers recently
reported that law enforcement agencies from all levels of government
submitted at least 1.3 million requests for user data in 2011.121 Some of the
carriers are so overwhelmed by such requests that they are outsourcing the
responses to third parties.122 In March 2012, journalist James Bamford,
relying on anonymous governmental sources, reported that NSA was
building a massive data-collection and storage center in Utah.123 According
119

We are certainly among them.

See Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra

note 7.
120 See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 246–47 (2007) (describing
the recent advances and comparing to past rate of growth).
121
Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2012, at A1.
122 Id. (“The outside provider, Neustar, said it handled law enforcement compliance for
about 400 phone and Internet companies.”).
123 James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What
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to Bamford:
Flowing through its servers and routers and stored in near-bottomless databases will
be all forms of communication, including the complete contents of private emails, cell
phone calls, and Google searches, as well as all sorts of personal data trails—parking
receipts, travel itineraries, bookstore purchases, and other digital “pocket litter.”124

NSA is not alone. Around the same time the Utah center was raising
concerns, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) obtained
discretionary access to nearly all data collected by the federal government,
including, but not limited to, information on “every airline passenger
entering the U.S.,” federally backed mortgage recipients’ financial data, and
Veterans Affairs medical records.125 NCTC hopes to analyze the data in
order to detect patterns that indicate terrorist activity.126
As these programs show, the federal government collects and analyzes
sizable amounts of data for a variety of purposes, from the administration of
public benefits to the administration of the census. Healthcare-related data
is a prominent part of the mix. For example, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires “any federally conducted or supported
health care or public health program, activity or survey (including Current
Population Surveys and American Community Surveys conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of the Census) [to] collect[] and
report [to Health and Human Services (DHHS)], to the extent practicable”
patient-reported information on sex, race, ethnicity, language, disability,
gender identity, and sexual orientation.127 DHHS will, in turn, aggregate
and analyze “quality and resource use measures from information systems
used to support health care delivery”128 and release to qualified private or
public entities “standardized extracts” of Medicare Part A, B, and D claims
You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/
ff_nsadatacenter/.
124 Id. Bamford concluded that the new Utah center would be “the realization of the
‘total information awareness’ program.”
Id.
Bamford’s accusations prompted a
congressional investigation and interview of NSA’s chief, who denied the accusations, but
Bamford points to both insider information and unique NSA definitions of words like
“intercept” to support his original report. James Bamford, NSA Chief Denies Domestic
Spying but Whistleblowers Say Otherwise, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2012, 2:37 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/nsa-whistleblower/all/.
125 Julia Angwin, U.S. Terror Agency to Tap Citizen Files, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012, at
A1.
126 Charlie Savage, U.S. Eases Rule on Use of Data on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2012, at A1 (“Moreover, the first two tracks for searching the databases that remain under
the control of the original agencies prohibit ‘pattern analysis.’ But that restriction does not
apply to databases the center has copied.”).
127 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3101, 124
Stat. 119, 578 (2010).
128 Id. § 10305, 124 Stat. at 939.
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for purposes of “performance measurement.”129 Pursuant to the ACA,
DHHS is authorized to expand the types of information it collects.130
Outside the provisions of the ACA, DHHS and Medicare programs
also collect data from contracted intermediaries, such as the private
insurance companies that manage claim reviews, and from Quality
Improvement Organizations (QIOs), which are typically private
nonprofits.131 In addition to supplying data, QIOs assist providers who
participate in the Electronic Record Health Incentive Program, which
requires reporting clinical quality measures like “health outcomes, clinical
processes, patient safety, efficient use of healthcare resources, care
coordination, patient engagements, population and public health, and
clinical guidelines.”132 Hospitals also provide the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) with patient survey information, readmission
statistics, and nosocomial infection data.133 More recently, DHHS
announced a data-sharing partnership with the nation’s leading private
insurance providers.134
The amount of personal information, including health information,
aggregated by government agencies, is referred to as “Big Data,” and for
good reason. Federal agencies, state authorities, and their private
contractors store mind-boggling amounts of information. Given the
quantity and scope of this information, there can be no doubt that Big Data
implicates privacy interests recognized by the mosaic theory of Fourth
Amendment privacy endorsed to varying degrees by the concurring
opinions in Jones.135 As the mosaic theory suggests, aggregations of rather
129

Id. § 10332, 124 Stat. at 968. The Secretary of HHS determines the format of the
released data and is responsible for protecting beneficiary privacy. Id.
130 Id. § 6504, 124 Stat. at 776–77 (adding “data elements from the automated data
system that the Secretary determines to be necessary for program integrity, program
oversight, and administration, at such frequency as the Secretary shall determine” to the
information a State must provide to receive reimbursement for maintaining automated data
systems under 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006)).
131 Quality Improvement Organizations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Quality
ImprovementOrgs/index.html (last modified May 20, 2013).
132 Clinical
Quality Measures, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Clinical
QualityMeasures.html (last modified Apr. 4, 2013).
133 Data Sources, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/
AboutData/Data-Sources.aspx (last visited May 25, 2013).
134 Press Release, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Obama Administration Announces
Ground-Breaking Public-Private Partnership to Prevent Health Care Fraud (July 26, 2012),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120726a.html.
135 See, e.g., Danielle Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(June 19, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06/big-data-
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innocuous information may “reveal[] more—sometimes a great deal
more—than does the sum of its parts.”136 This is a particularly likely
prospect given Big Data’s use of increasingly sophisticated analytics, which
promise to reveal far more about us than is disclosed by the raw bits and
bytes, no matter how “big” or small the data.137 The dangers are yet more
pronounced if health-related data is part of the mix because of what this
information can reveal about the most intimate of our affairs.138
Healthcare data, by definition, contains information that the Supreme
Court has already ruled fundamentally private, such as reproductive
choice,139 and information that the Court may deem private in the near
future, such as genetic data.140 But not all healthcare data is protected. In
Whalen v. Roe, the Court found no threat to privacy in a law that required
physicians to report to the Department of Health personal and identifying
information of patients who were prescribed certain drugs.141 Because the
required disclosure was similar to existing and essential procedures, like
mandatory child abuse reporting or sharing information with insurance
companies for reimbursement,142 and the statute provided adequate security
against data breach, the Court held that any risk to patient privacy was

brokers-as-fiduciaries.html (describing some of the dangers of Big Data for citizens).
136 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
137 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0 (recounting how Target uses publicly available databases and market analytics to
identify women who are in the early stages of pregnancy).
138 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(pointing out how GPS-enabled surveillance is capable of painting detailed pictures of
subjects’ private lives when they reveal information such as “‘trips to the psychiatrist, the
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center’” (quoting People v. Weaver,
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009))).
139 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that a law
forbidding contraception was an unacceptable invasion of marital privacy). In criticizing the
contraception law, the Griswold Court touched on the issue of police investigation,
remarking, “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms
for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id.
140 See, e.g., David Kravets, Pivotal DNA Privacy Case Gets Supreme Court Hearing,
WIRED (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/11/scotus-grantsdna-case/ (reporting that the Court has decided to hear King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 (Md.
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), a case in which the suspect was required to give
a DNA sample upon arrest, which later led to a conviction for another crime).
141 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1977). The reporting form included the name
of “the prescribing physician; the dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dosage; and the name,
address, and age of the patient.” Id. at 593.
142 Id. at 602 & n.29.
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insufficient to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.143 In so holding,
however, the Court hinted that, absent adequate security measures,
government acquisition or disclosure of massive amounts of private data
would implicate privacy protections.144 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan
did more than hint, suggesting that it may be necessary to restrain
technological advancements that make such data accumulations possible.145
A little over ten years later, the Court again considered privacy issues
relating to data aggregation, this time in the form of rap sheets.146 Although
the individual criminal events that compose a rap sheet may be public
record, the Court held that the rap sheet, as a summary of the total criminal
events in an individual’s life, represented a potential and “substantial”147
threat to privacy,148 particularly because of advances in technology that
allowed for greater storage capacity.149 Unlike in Whalen, where the Court
emphasized the routine disclosure of confidential information under specific
but frequent circumstances, the Court in U.S. Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press took pains to illustrate the
very limited and considered means by which a third party can access rap
sheet data.150 Additionally, the Court dismissed the argument that the
143 Id. at 603–04. The Court also refused to find any violation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment because, the cases cited, unlike in Whalen, “involve[d] affirmative,
unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the course of
criminal investigations.” Id. at 604 n.32.
144 Id. at 605–06.
145 Id. at 606–07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
752 (1989) (“Rap sheets compiled pursuant to such authority contain certain descriptive
information, such as date of birth and physical characteristics, as well as a history of arrests,
charges, convictions, and incarcerations of the subject. . . . [T]hey are sometimes incorrect
or incomplete and sometimes contain information about other persons with similar names.”).
147 Id. at 771.
148 See id. at 764 (“Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police
stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.”).
149 Id. at 771 (“The substantial character of that interest is affected by the fact that in
today’s society the computer can accumulate and store information that would otherwise
have surely been forgotten long before a person attains age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are
discarded.”). The Court also quoted heavily from the dissent of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which warned against turning the government into a
“clearinghouse for highly personal information.” Id. at 761 (quoting Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 831 F.2d 1124, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr,
J., dissenting), rev’d, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)).
150 Id. at 752 (explaining that the FBI considers rap sheets “confidential and, with certain
exceptions, has restricted their use to governmental purposes”); id. at 753 (describing the
three exceptions Congress created for the release of rap sheets: (1) as required by State
licensing requirements; (2) “to self-regulatory organizations in the securities industry,” and
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privacy interest in the sum of public events listed on a rap sheet
“approaches zero.”151 The Court concluded that “although there is
undoubtedly some public interest in anyone’s criminal history,” the interest
is not central to the government-monitoring purpose of FOIA, which is to
allow citizens to monitor the government, not individuals.152
Although neither of these cases implicated the Fourth Amendment,
they involved personal data similar or identical to that which is currently
being collected and stored as part of Big Data projects. Accordingly, they
incorporate key factors the Court may use to decide whether large quantities
of aggregated healthcare data can trigger privacy concerns. Among these
seem to be the extent to which disclosure is commonplace, whether the data
is aggregated or dispersed, and the intent of the law authorizing collection
or release. The last factor is crucial as it relates to Big Data. The stated
intent of the ACA is quite broad, ranging from quality control to fraud
prevention to cost containment.153 By giving researchers, law enforcement,
and administrators access to large amounts of information, Big Data could
conceivably be used for all three purposes and more.
As we pointed out in Part II, the fact that contemporary surveillance
technology, including data-aggregation technology and sophisticated
analytics deployed as part of “Big Data,” may constitute a Fourth
Amendment “search” does not mean that the government and its agents
should be denied all access. Rather, what the Fourth Amendment demands
is a balancing of legitimate governmental interests served by Big Data with
the privacy interests threatened by Big Data. To this point, most of the
academic articles and journalistic exposés on Big Data have focused on the
second half of that equation. In the remainder of this Part, we draw
attention to one important weight on the government’s side of the scale:
efforts to prevent, detect, and prosecute healthcare fraud.
B. THE VALUE OF BIG DATA IN COMBATING HEALTHCARE FRAUD

Any reasonable discussion of healthcare fraud must include Medicare.
Medicare is a government health insurance program for the elderly and the
disabled.154 Every day, 4.5 million claims for Medicare services are

(3) for “licensees or applicants before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission”).
151 Id. at 763.
152 Id. at 774.
153 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1313,
3001, 124 Stat 119, 184, 353 (2010).
154 What Is Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/
decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last visited May 21,
2013).
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processed.155 In 2011, the program covered almost 49 million people,
spending over $500 billion.156 The extent of Medicare fraud is unknown,157
but it is believed to cost the government somewhere between $60 billion
and $90 billion a year.158 Hospitalization claims are the most common
source of civil fraud investigations, while outpatient, medical equipment,
and lab work claims are the most common sources of criminal fraud
investigations.159 Home-health agencies and providers of durable medical
equipment have particularly high fraud rates.160
Healthcare fraud generally—and Medicare fraud in particular—
frequently involves health providers’ charging for services never provided,
billing for unnecessary equipment, stealing medical identities, paying
kickbacks for referrals, or using a Medicare number for fraudulent billing.
Complex schemes often incorporate a mix of strategies.161 To identify
155 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAUD PREVENTION SYSTEM—FIRST IMPLEMENTATION YEAR 11
(2012), available at http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/fraud-rtc12142012.pdf; Medicare
Advantage Plans, MEDICARE.GOV., http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/medicare
-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/medicare-advantage-plans.html (last visited May 21,
2013); What Is Medicare?, supra note 154 (explaining that Part C is the Medicare
Advantage Program, which is a managed care system for individuals with both Part A and
Part B; Part D is the optional prescription program).
156 How Is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/about-us/howmedicare-is-funded/medicare-funding.html (last visited May 21, 2013). With an enrollment
of about sixty million people, Medicaid covers more individuals, yet Medicare expenditures
were over $150 billion more than Medicaid expenditures. Medicaid Information by Topic,
MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
By-Topic.html (last visited May 21, 2013); NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html (last modified Jan. 9,
2013).
157 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-213T, TYPES OF PROVIDERS INVOLVED
IN MEDICARE CASES, AND CMS EFFORTS TO REDUCE FRAUD 1 (2012) (testimony of Kathleen
M. King, Director, Health Care, before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy &
Commerce) [hereinafter GAO-13-213T].
158 Kennedy, supra note 15.
159 GAO-13-213T, supra note 157, at 3–5 (2012) (“According to 2010 data, about onequarter of the 7,848 subjects investigated in criminal health care fraud cases were medical
facilities or were affiliated with these facilities. Additionally, about 16 percent of subjects
were durable medical equipment suppliers. . . . Hospitals constituted nearly 20 percent of
the 2,339 subjects of civil fraud cases investigated in 2010, and other medical facilities
accounted for about 18 percent of the subjects.”).
160 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-801T, MEDICARE: PROGRESS MADE
TO DETER FRAUD, BUT MORE COULD BE DONE 4 (2012) (testimony of Kathleen M. King,
Director, Health Care, before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on
Energy & Commerce) (illustrating the weaknesses; GAO successfully created two fake
DME providers).
161 M.B. Pell, AJC Investigation: Mailbox Medical Schemes on Rise: Medicare Fraud
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fraudulent billing practices, automated systems help investigators flag
impossible claims, such as a provider’s alleged removal of twenty toenails
from three toes or bills for more therapy sessions than Newtonian physics
would allow.162 Phantom billing may involve elaborate schemes in which
there are in fact no physical clinics, patients, or health practitioners. For
example, a member of an Armenian organized crime group recently
admitted to creating a network of clinics and providers that existed only on
paper, but nevertheless billed Medicare for nearly $100 million and
received over $35 million in payments.163
Similar to phantom billing is billing for services that are not medically
necessary. In one case, a doctor with a penchant for Playboy models and
Picassos received “$1.2 million from Medicare in 2008 . . . a large portion
of it from physical therapy,” consisting of “heat packs, massage, electrical
stimulation and ultrasound.”164 Although government-funded massages are
relatively harmless to patients, other unnecessary treatments can be invasive
and life threatening. In a recent case, investigators discovered that patients
who were disoriented and unable to control their bodily functions were
being forced to attend group therapy that served no medical purpose.165
Costs Taxpayers, but Agency Claims It’s Hard to Stop, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 2, 2012, at
A1 (examining the process scammers use to steal providers’ identities and set up phony
clinics with post office boxes); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Cal., Third
Physician Sentenced to Lengthy Prison Sentence in Medicare Fraud Case (Oct. 24, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cae/news/docs/2012/10-2012/10-24-12Prakash
Sent.html (highlighting a medical office that paid beneficiaries to use their Medicare
numbers to bill for phantom services where “[f]ew of these tests were ever performed, none
were performed based on any medical need, and clinic employees filled out other portions of
the charts using preprinted templates” and “[s]ome clinic employees admitted to performing
various tests on themselves, and placing the results in patient files”).
162 Mark Schoofs & Maurice Tamman, Confidentiality Cloaks Medicare Abuse, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 22, 2010, at A1 (“A physical therapist in Brooklyn . . . billed for so much
therapy—more than $2.5 million in 2008 alone—that it would have been virtually
impossible for him to have performed it all within state and Medicare guidelines . . . .”); see
also Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health
Information 48, 52 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (explaining that a
doctor’s billing specialists would “upcode” by billing for time not spent directly with the
patient, resulting in daily billings that exceeded 24 hours).
163 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Leader of $100 Million
Medicare Fraud Scheme Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Racketeering and
Other Crimes (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
October12/MirzoyanDavitPleaPR.php.
164 Schoofs & Tamman, supra note 162 (explaining that, despite the unusually limited
scope of his treatments, a doctor’s Medicare earnings were “more than 24 times the
Medicare income of the average family doctor, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of
Medicare-claims data” and that he closed his practice after Medicare began denying his
claims and worked at a pain management clinic at the time the article was published).
165 Warren Richey, US Agents Make Arrests in Massive Medicare Fraud Case in
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Providers altered their records so it would appear that patients benefited
from therapy that was anything but helpful.166 In another case, the
government alleged that a nursing home required therapists to use the most
expensive treatments on residents, even if the interventions were
inappropriate or dangerous.167 For example, it alleged that a ninety-twoyear-old cancer patient in Orlando, who was routinely spitting up blood,
nonetheless received 48 minutes of physical therapy, 47 minutes of
occupational therapy, and 30 minutes of speech therapy, two days before
his death. The day he died, the patient received 35 minutes of physical
therapy and was scheduled for more therapy later in the day.168 CMS
reported a dermatologist who, in addition to unnecessarily removing
“benign skin lesions,” reused sutures, thereby exposing patients to HIV,
hepatitis C, and other diseases.169
Claims for medical equipment are another common target for
fraudsters. Two Los Angeles pastors recently were found guilty of running
separate schemes involving power wheelchairs.
In the first, the
conspirators purchased fraudulent medical documentation and billed
Medicare $6,000 for power wheelchairs that actually cost $900.170 The
conspirators also offered wheelchairs and other unnecessary equipment to
Medicare beneficiaries in exchange for their Medicare numbers.171 If
Medicare refused to pay for the chairs, the pastor instructed his employees
to take the chairs away from the beneficiaries.172 The funds from the
scheme were diverted among sham supply companies run by the pastor’s
wife and other church members.173 A second pastor and a doctor who
Florida, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 21, 2010, at 8 (“‘Employees who failed to cooperate
or participate in the fraud were terminated,’ the [court] documents say. ‘One ATC employee
was fired after she discharged several beneficiaries she felt were not eligible . . . due to their
mental state.’ The records say a senior manager later readmitted those same beneficiaries.”).
The owner of the company is currently serving a 50-year sentence, “the stiffest Medicarefraud punishment in history.” Jay Weaver, Women Convicted of Medicare Fraud at Fort
Lauderdale Therapy Clinic, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/11/19/3105498/women-convicted-of-medicare-fraud.html.
166 Richey supra note 165; Weaver, supra note 165.
167 Thomas M. Burton, Medicare Fraud Is Charged, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2012, 7:26
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323717004578157640024945594.
html.
168 Id.
169 Medicare Advantage Plans, supra note 155, at 33.
170 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Los Angeles Church
Pastor Sentenced to Serve 36 Months in Prison for $14.2 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme
(Feb. 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-crm-256.html.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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provided fraudulent documentation pleaded guilty to running a similar
conspiracy later in the same year.174
Prescription medicines provide another rich territory for healthcare
fraud. A well-known dialysis provider was accused in 2012 of intentionally
wasting medication by giving multiple partial doses, instead of smaller
numbers of full doses, in order to inflate charges.175 Later that same year, a
Miami pharmacy owner pleaded guilty to fraud charges for instructing his
employees to retrieve from assisted-living facilities unused medication
already billed to Medicare and Medicaid so that it could be repackaged and
reused.176 The repackaged medicine was distributed to other assisted-living
facilities or the general public and resubmitted to insurance.177 The
pharmacist also paid assisted-living facilities to refer residents.178 In
Baltimore, a pharmacist admitted to purchasing drums of drugs from an
unlicensed provider, mislabeling them, and dispensing them to
customers.179 The same pharmacist submitted claims to Medicare for
prescription refills that were not dispensed to beneficiaries.180 Still another
pharmacist admitted to paying Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries for
their prescriptions and then submitting reimbursement claims to insurance
companies without dispensing the medication.181 Among his targets were

174

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Los Angeles-Area
Church Pastor Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering and Conspiring with Doctors, Others to
Defraud Medicare of More than $11 Million (Dec. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1506.html.
175 Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Dialysis Company Accused of Giant Medicare
Fraud, CNN.COM (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/30/health/medicare-fraudcase/index.html.
176 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Pharmacy Owner Pleads
Guilty in Miami for Role in $23 Million Health Care Fraud Scheme (Dec. 6, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1461.html.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Md., Pharmacy Owner Sentenced to
Over 4 Years for Health Care Fraud, Aggravated Identity Theft and Conspiracy to Misbrand
Drugs (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/md/Public-Affairs/press_
releases/press08/PharmacyOwnerSentencedtoover4YearsforHealthCareFraudAggravatedIde
ntityTheftandConspiracy.html (“Agents recovered drugs from the pharmacies with
expiration dates removed and others with altered labels. Agents seized more controlled
substances from [the pharmacist]’s home, including Oxycodone, Fentanyl, Adderall and
Kadian, all of which were expired.”).
180 Id.
181 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Dorchester Pharmacist
Convicted for Defrauding Medicare and Medicaid (July 20, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/McGeePleaPR.html; Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Pharmacist Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Defraud
Medicaid (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2010/
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patients with HIV or mental illness, whose medications are particularly
expensive.182
Patients are not always innocent victims, of course. Beneficiaries
often participate in healthcare fraud schemes in exchange for services or
kickbacks.183 Kickbacks range from cash184 and cigarettes185 to spa services
and lunches.186 In a massive operation in New York, conspirators paid
$500,000 to beneficiaries in a special “kickback room.” 187 Some of these
schemes are far more Dickensian, providing subsistence benefits, such as
housing, to vulnerable beneficiaries and then threatening them with
homelessness if they refuse to comply with the fraud.188 Whether through
coercion, persuasion, or deception, individuals engaged in fraud expose
Medicare beneficiaries, who are often ill or limited in capacity, to
substantial risks.
Medical identity theft is a significant problem as well. CMS reports
that, in 2011, a man was convicted of stealing his brother’s medical
information and using it for surgery covered under his brother’s insurance.
September/OnujioguAmadiegwuPleaPR.html.
182 See sources cited supra note 181.
183 The Government Accountability Office reported that about 11% of the successful
criminal fraud prosecutions were of beneficiaries. GAO-13-213T, supra note 157, at 4.
184 Mark Schoofs et al., Medicare-Fraud Crackdown Corrals 114, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
2011, at A3 (reporting that, according to the indictment, the following exchange took place
between a provider and a beneficiary: “Beneficiary: ‘Each person I refer to you is $200 or
$250?’ [Provider]: ‘I’m going to be honest with you. I will give you $150. Alright $250,
$200. [Expletive] I ain’t goin fifty ’cause I got to have something now, come on’”).
185 91 Are Charged with Fraud, Billing Millions to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012,
at B5 (“Some patients watched TV instead of receiving services . . . .”).
186 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Brooklyn, N.Y.,
Physician and Clinic President Pleads Guilty to Medicare Fraud Scheme (Dec. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1474.html.
187 Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. Charges 94 People with Health-Care Fraud, WASH.
POST, July 17, 2010, at A14; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub.
Affairs, Brooklyn, N.Y., Clinic Employee Pleads Guilty in Connection with $71 Million
Medicare Fraud Scheme (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/
December/12-crm-1436.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs,
Owner of Brooklyn Clinic Pleads Guilty in Connection with $71 Million Medicare Fraud
Scheme (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/
owner-of-brooklyn-clinic-pleads-guilty-in-connection-with-71-million-medicare-fraudscheme (“In total, 16 individuals have been charged in the Bay Medical scheme, including
two doctors, nine clinic owners/operators/employees and five external money launderers.”);
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Two Brooklyn Clinic
Employees Plead Guilty in Connection with $71 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme (Nov. 28,
2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-crm-1419.html.
188 Jay Weaver, Ex-Director of Miami Gardens Mental Health Clinic Imprisoned for 8
Years for Medicare Fraud, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/
2012/12/21/3152770/ex-director-of-miami-gardens-mental.html#storylink=cpy.

776

DAVID GRAY ET AL.

[Vol. 103

The victim’s medical records in turn incorrectly included his brother’s HIVpositive status, which put the true beneficiary at risk of receiving medically
unnecessary drugs and procedures.189
Perpetrators also steal the identities of unsuspecting providers who
have already been approved by Medicare in order to file fraudulent
claims.190 In one case, a home-health agency owner stopped paying his
licensed personnel and, when they quit, billed hundreds of claims under his
former employees’ licenses.191 Organized crime is also involved, creating
networks of nonexistent clinics based on stolen provider information, often
leading to suspicious claims, such as “[a] pregnant woman who gets an
ultrasound exam—from an ear, nose and throat doctor[, a] forensic
pathologist whose patients walked into his office, rather than being rolled in
with toe tags[, a] dermatologist who conducted heart tests[, or a]
psychiatrist who performed M.R.I.’s.”192
Although some providers’ identities are stolen, others lend, rent, or sell
their identities to facilitate fraud schemes.193 Take, for example, a case in
New Jersey where a licensed provider was “frequently either not in the
office at all, or was in his personal office watching television.”194 He
provided “pre-signed, blank prescription forms” to the unlicensed
employees who were diagnosing patients.195 In another case, unlicensed
physicians paid a licensed physician “$2,000 a month to review and sign
medical records prepared by physician assistants.”196
189

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 34.
Michael Wilson & William K. Rashbaum, Real Patients, Real Doctors, Fake
Everything Else, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A31 (“The scheme sidestepped the
cumbersome element of most Medicare schemes, which typically involve pairing up a
corrupt doctor with a complicit patient faking an injury.”).
191 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of N.J., Toms River, New Jersey Man
Admits Posing as a Doctor, Treating Elderly Patients in Medicare Fraud Scheme (July 11,
2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2011/toms-river-new-jerseyman-admits-posing-as-a-doctor-treating-elderly-patients-in-medicare-fraud-scheme.
192 Wilson & Rashbaum, supra note 190, at A31.
193 Pell, supra note 161, at A1 (“Using a sham provider number and a UPS Store address,
a scam artist can provide what looks like a real physician’s approval for unnecessary or nonexistent medical services and equipment for a company that is registered to bill Medicare.”).
194 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of N.J., Rahway, New Jersey Man
Admits Posing as Licensed Physician in Medicaid and Medicare Fraud Scheme (May 9,
2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2011/rahway-new-jersey-manadmits-posing-as-licensed-physician-in-medicaid-and-medicare-fraud-scheme.
195 Id.
196 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Ill., U.S. Arrests Owners of Home
Health Care Business and Suspended Podiatrist on Charges Alleging Medicare and Visa
Fraud (July 20, 2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2011/u.s.arrests-owners-of-home-health-care-business-and-suspended-podiatrist-on-charges-allegingmedicare-and-visa-fraud; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Ill.,
190
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Healthcare fraud is increasingly accomplished and facilitated by
electronic means.197 Rather than steal patient information on an individual
basis, hackers target medical information databases. In May 2012, a group
of hackers based in Eastern Europe breached Utah’s healthcare database,
gaining access to over 780,000 records, including Social Security numbers
and medical diagnosis codes.198 These records are essential for fraudulent
billing. According to one report, “an individual healthcare record is worth
more on the black market ($50, on average) than a U.S.-based credit card
and personal identity with social security number combined.”199 As
healthcare fraud moves into the digital arena, traditional methods of
detection and prosecution are simply inadequate. A cybercrime requires a
cybersolution, which, in the case of healthcare fraud, will almost certainly
include Big Data.
C. HOW BIG DATA SERVES GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN
PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING HEALTHCARE
FRAUD

The overwhelming majority of data that CMS and its contractors use to
detect fraud comes from claims, payment, and referral records.200 Now that
Chicago Area Dermatologist and Psychologist Charged in Nationwide Medicare Fraud
Strike Force Takedown (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/
chicago/2012/pr1004_01.pdf (announcing that two of the defendants were convicted and a
third pleaded guilty).
197 Compare Cynthia M. Stamer, Cybercrime and Identity Theft: Health Information
Security Beyond HIPAA, 1 ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (2005), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/stamer_
right.html (explaining how healthcare identity theft is an increasing problem), and Neal
Ungerleider, Medical Cybercrime: The Next Frontier, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 15, 2012, 3:34
PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3000470/medical-cybercrime-next-frontier (reporting
incidences of medical-record and medical-equipment hacking), with Lara Jakes Jordan, 38
Charged in Phishing Scams: Consumer Data Target of Global Ring, WASH. POST, May 20,
2008, at D3 (describing a general identity-theft operation), Cassell Bryan-Low, Identity
Thieves Organize; Investigators See New Pattern: Criminals Team Up to Sell Stolen Data
Over the Internet, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2005, at B1 (outlining methods of identity theft
aimed at financial data), and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Int’l Cyber-Fraud Ring
Responsible for Millions of Dollars in Fraud Dismantled (Dec. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1452.html (publicizing a scheme
wherein individuals posted fraudulent vehicle ads on websites).
198 Common Questions, UTAH DEP’T OF HEALTH, DATA BREACH SOLUTION CTR.,
http://www.health.utah.gov/databreach/common-questions.html (last visited May 21, 2013).
199 Keith Tyson, What’s the Market Value of a Healthcare Record?, DELL
SECUREWORKS (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.secureworks.com/media/blog/general/marketvalue-of-a-healthcare-record/; see also Cole Petrochko, DHC: EHR Data Target for Identity
Thieves, MEDPAGE TODAY (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.medpagetoday.com/Practice
Management/InformationTechnology/30074.
200 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 17; see also Pasquale,
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CMS is partnering with private insurance organizations, it will have access
to private claims and other health data.201 Additionally, the Medicare
Integrity Manual lists a dozen types of data that contract agencies should
use when investigating suspicious activity, including: (1) the nature of the
providers and staff; (2) the structure of the business, overhead costs, and its
relationship to other businesses; (3) the amount of business generally and
the amount of business from Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements
specifically; (4) the types of services rendered; (5) location; (6) history of
claims and any previous investigations; and (7) “[o]ther information needed
to explain and/or clarify the issue(s) in question.”202
In part due to the involvement of international organized crime
syndicates, the Department of Justice (DOJ), which investigates and
prosecutes fraud cases, considers healthcare fraud an indicator of potential
terrorism.203
DOJ describes healthcare providers as “nontraditional
information gatherers [that] can provide [interagency data-sharing] fusion
centers with both strategic and tactical information,”204 including “health
surveillance networks [and] syndromic surveillance.”205 It recommends that
fusion centers, which serve as hubs for local, state, and federal information
gathering and sharing,206 collaborate with healthcare providers to develop
analytical tools.207 Access to fusion-center networks means having the
ability to mine and analyze vast public databases at the state, local, and
federal level; data-broker dossiers on millions of individuals; private
supra note 162, at 46 (“The public-private surveillance partnerships pioneered in [HHS and
DOJ’s] fraud fighting efforts are a model for both the first order problem of collecting and
analyzing data and the second order problem of ‘watching the watchers’ to ensure that data
is used properly.”); id. at 49 (describing the intergration of numerous data sources for the
purpose of detecting fraud).
201 Press Briefing, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Fraud Prevention
Partnership Announcement Event (July 26, 2012), available at http://www.stopfraud.gov/
iso/opa/stopfraud/ag-speech-120726.html.
202 MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL 2.4(B) (rev. ed. Nov. 20, 2009), available
at
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/pim83
c02.pdf.
203 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES 13 (2006), available at
http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf
(“Many
experts believe that there is a high probability of identifying terrorists through precursor
criminal activity, including illegal drug operations, money laundering, fraud, terrorism, and
identity theft.”) (internal citation omitted).
204 Id. at 17.
205 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH SECURITY: PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL
INTEGRATION FOR FUSION CENTERS 6 (2011), available at www.it.ojp.gov/doc
downloader.aspx?ddid=1450.
206 State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (last visited May 21, 2013).
207 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 205, at 8.
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databases held by cooperating entities; video streams from public and
private cameras; and far more. In prosecuting fraud cases, DOJ will have
access to CMS’s data as well as any data aggregated and analyzed by fusion
centers. In short, efforts to prevent, detect, and prosecute healthcare fraud
are increasingly tied to Big Data.
Already an important tool for regulators and law enforcement, Big
Data is likely to become a more powerful and important asset in the years to
come.208 The ACA contains a provision requiring the release of some of
Medicare’s billing data, which previously had been blocked by a court
ruling citing physician privacy.209 CMS has discussed plans to leverage the
detection benefits of Big Data to facilitate a move towards “fraud
prevention,” rather than the former method of paying claims and later
attempting to reclaim funds fraudulently acquired.210 To this end, CMS has
developed multiple task forces and agencies that tap private-sector
information technology resources.211 The most recent initiative is the Fraud
Prevention System (FPS), a response to requirements in the Small Business
Jobs Act of 2010 “to implement predictive analytics technologies to

208

See John Carreyrou & Tom McGinty, Medicare Records Reveal Troubling Trail of
Surgeries, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2011, at A1; Markon, supra note 187, at A14 (“In May
2009, the administration launched a high-level task force, the Health Care Fraud Prevention
and Enforcement Action Team, which uses electronic claims data—and the threat of federal
prosecution—to seek out illicit billing.”); Pasquale, supra note 162, at 54 (“[I]t is important
to recognize the successes of contractors in utilizing sophisticated data mining to fight fraud.
While HHS and DOJ recovered $2.5 billion in 2009, they recovered more than $4 billion in
fiscal year 2010. The high-tech Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement Action Team
(HEAT) established by the agencies has also enhanced monitoring capacity.”); Mark
Schoofs & Maurice Tamman, In Medicare’s Data Trove, Clues to Curing Cost Crisis, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 26, 2010, at A1 (describing the preliminary findings revealed by the Wall Street
Journal and the nonprofit Center for Public Integrity, once they obtained a Medicare
provider reimbursement database, and emphasizing the need for greater access to such
information).
209 Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Feds to Allow Use of Medicare Data to Rate Doctors,
MINN. NPR (Dec. 5, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/12/05/fedsallow-medicare-data-to-rate-doctors/ (“Doctors will be individually identifiable through the
Medicare files, but personal data on their patients will remain confidential.”); see also
Pasquale, supra note 162, at 16. But see Robert O’Harrow, Jr, Health-Care Sector
Vulnerable to Hackers, Researchers Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-25/news/36015727_1_health-care-medicaldevices-patient-care (criticizing the security provisions required by the electronic records
program of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which was part of “the Obama
administration’s first big step toward health-care reform”).
210 Schoofs & Tamman, Confidentiality Cloaks Medicare Abuse, supra note 162.
211 For an explanation of the various roles of private contractors in CMS data analysis
and fraud detection, see Pasquale, supra note 162, at 50–52. See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 10 (corporate partners for FPS are Northrop
Grumman, Verizon, National Government Services, IBM, and Health Integrity).
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identify and prevent the payment of improper claims in the Medicare feefor-service program.”212
All of Medicare’s daily 4.5 million claims run through FPS’s
“predictive algorithms and other sophisticated analytics,”213 which are
similar to those used by credit card companies to detect fraudulent
purchases.214 Although FPS cannot automatically stop payments, it
“automatically generates and prioritizes leads for review and
investigation.”215 FPS addresses the problem of data silos by analyzing
claims nationwide216 and over a period of time,217 both of which are
necessary for identifying fraudulent behavior.218 FPS also complements the
Automated Provider Screening System; the two systems are now slated for
integration.219 CMS has more plans to expand the reach and power of FPS,
including social network analysis220 and adaptive analytics.221
According to CMS, in 2011 “FPS also generated leads for 536 new . . .
investigations, augmented information for 511 pre-existing investigations,
and prompted 617 provider interviews and 1,642 beneficiary interviews to
verify legitimate provision of Medicare services and supplies.”222 CMS
claims that these efforts resulted in a savings of $115 million.223 Although
modest when compared to the total of $4.1 billion that CMS recovered from
fraud schemes through partnerships with private contractors and
government agencies in 2011,224 the program is just getting started, and

212

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at ii.
Id. at iv, 11.
214 Id. at 4, 11.
215 Id. at v, 36.
216 Id. at 8.
217 Id. at 36.
218 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-104, MEDICARE FRAUD PREVENTION
CMS HAS IMPLEMENTED A PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS SYSTEM, BUT NEEDS TO DEFINE MEASURES
TO DETERMINE ITS EFFECTIVENESS 6 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/
649537.pdf.
219 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at 25, 37 (“The most
effective prevention tool is revoking the billing privileges of providers who are known bad
actors.”).
220 Id. at vi, 18.
221 Id. at 16.
222 Id. at 23.
223 See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 155, at app. A
(DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A-17-12-53000, THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES HAS IMPLEMENTED PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS
TECHNOLOGIES BUT CAN IMPROVE ITS REPORTING ON RELATED SAVINGS AND RETURN ON
INVESTMENT (2012)). The methods CMS used to calculate the savings have been criticized.
224 About Fraud, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/
index.html (last visited May 21, 2013).
213
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officials expect to prevent or recover billions of dollars in losses.225
Even when FPS was in its infancy, the Wall Street Journal drew
attention to suspicious providers using simple data analysis of a database
“contain[ing] records only through 2008, and includ[ing] the claims of just
5% of randomly selected Medicare beneficiaries.”226 In 2010, the Journal
described the suspect practices of a physical therapist who later pleaded
guilty to healthcare fraud.227 Among other charges, the doctor submitted a
claim for a service that occurred while he was on vacation.228 The Journal
used the same comparatively limited data set to identify a surgeon who was
practicing in Texas after being temporarily banned from Medicare because
he had performed unnecessary and harmful surgeries in New Jersey.229 The
Journal found that the readmitted doctor’s death rate was seven times
higher than the national average.230 Another surgeon appeared to perform
an unusually high number of multiple spinal operations per patient.231
Investigating these types of activities requires access to Big Data.
With Big Data, governmental systems can identify providers who bill more
over a specified time period than other providers in the region. Claims
analysis can detect providers who authorize particularly expensive
equipment.
Analysis of individuals’ claims over time can reveal
discrepancies or impossibilities, such as multiple hysterectomies, which
indicate possible identity theft or kickbacks. Looking at groups of
individual claims could also reveal possible kickbacks if, for instance, a
sizeable population in a community suddenly switches to a less convenient
pharmacy. As FPS incorporates social network models, the system will
gain further leverage on its data, allowing it to compare individuals against
known criminal associations, including those that work primarily in the

225

HEAT Task Force, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/about
fraud/heattaskforce/index.html (last visited May 21, 2013).
226 Schoofs & Tamman, supra note 162; see also Carreyrou & McGinty, supra note 208
(“For the past year, the Journal has been mining Medicare’s claims databases to expose how
some doctors potentially defraud the taxpayer-funded health program for the elderly and
disabled and game its reimbursement system.”). In December 2011, HHS decided to release
more information about doctors who participate in Medicare in response to provisions in the
Affordable Care Act. See John Carreyrou, Access to Widen on Medicare Data, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 8, 2011, at A6.
227 Mark Schoofs, Medicare Fraud Nets Guilty Plea, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2011, at A3.
228 Id.
229 Carreyrou & McGinty, supra note 208, at A16.
230 Id. (“In 2008 and 2009, nine of 49 Medicare patients on whom he performed an
elective surgery died, three of them within days of the operation, according to the Medicare
data. That equates to 18.4 deaths per 100 of the procedures, compared with a national
average of 2.4 per 100 for the procedure.”).
231 Id.
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virtual world of black-market healthcare data. The more data the system
can use to build comparative models, the more accurately the models will
reflect standard practice.232 As evidence of this potential, CMS recently
credited “sophisticated data analysis” for the indictment of a homehealthcare physician in “the biggest health-care fraud case brought against a
single doctor.”233 The doctor certified over 5,000 patients a year for homehealthcare by having his employees complete certification forms using his
forged signature.234
Although many healthcare fraud cases originate through direct
reporting, including qui tam actions, complicated schemes like those
involving organized crime are more vulnerable to data analysis, which can
review and compare large volumes of claims over time. To achieve its
stated goal of stopping fraudulent payments before they reach the provider,
CMS will need robust analytical tools that can probe massive quantities of
disparate data to flag automatically suspect claims across a wide range of
covered services and also evolve to identify new fraudulent behavior as it
develops. That capacity is likely to be greatly enhanced in coming years as
CMS programs gain access to the vast quantities of consumer and other
data currently brokered through third-party aggregators. At each turn, the
government and its agents will face potential Fourth Amendment barriers
erected by the mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy.
D. STRIKING A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY
INTERESTS AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN
PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING HEALTHCARE
FRAUD

According to the mosaic theory, gathering the large quantities of
information engaged by Big Data raises significant Fourth Amendment
privacy issues—all the more so when that data is processed through
sophisticated analytical software. Although troubling from a privacy point
of view, the foregoing shows that the government’s interest in Big Data is

232 But see Robert Radick, Claims Data and Health Care Fraud: The Controversy
Continues, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/
09/25/claims-data-and-health-care-fraud-the-controversy-continues/ (criticizing reliance on
claims data that CMS officials have admitted can be inaccurate).
233 Sari Horwitz, Tex. Doctor Charged in $375 Million Health-Care Scam, Largest of Its
Kind, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2012, at A1 (“[The] alleged scheme resulted in more than $350
million being fraudulently billed to Medicare and more than $24 million to Medicaid.”).
234 Id. The doctor’s home also contained incriminating evidence, including “the books
‘Hide Your Assets and Disappear: A Step-by-Step Guide to Vanishing Without a Trace,’ and
‘The Offshore Money Manual,’ suggesting 23 worldwide locations favorable to offshore
banking.” Id.
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not nefarious or idle. Rather, it is rationally tied to legitimate regulatory
and law enforcement interests in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting
various forms of Medicare and healthcare fraud.
The mosaic theory would certainly impact these legitimate
governmental interests. It would not, however, bar access to Big Data.
Rather, where a law enforcement method, practice, or technology
encroaches upon reasonable expectations of privacy, the mosaic theory will
require that access and use be limited and constrained to effect a
“reasonable” balance between law enforcement interests and citizens’
privacy interests.235 In the context of physical searches of the home, the
warrant requirement does this work.236 But, for Big Data, the warrant
requirement would fail to strike a reasonable balance because it would
render the technology largely useless from the government’s point of view.
The whole point of Big Data is, after all, to gather large quantities of data
and to submit it to analysis without having any specific prior suspicions of
wrongdoing by particular people. On the other hand, granting law
enforcement unfettered access to Big Data and its products would
effectively leave unrecognized and unprotected important quantitative
privacy interests. The challenge going forward, then, will be for
government officials and their private-sector contractors to work with
interest groups, academics, legislators, and ultimately the courts to tailor
Big Data programs in ways that effect a reasonable balance of these
competing interests. Although it is beyond the scope of the present Article
to do so, we offer a sketch below of what some of the broad framework
might look like.237

235

See Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 28.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a
search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one’s
own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be
reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a
grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by
a policeman or Government enforcement agent.”).
237 See infra Part IV.D; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 35–40.
236

784

DAVID GRAY ET AL.

[Vol. 103

IV. HOW DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE SERVES GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN
PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING CYBERHARASSMENT
As Justice Alito notes in his Jones concurrence, we no longer live in a
“pre-computer age.”238 Quite to the contrary, whether in the form of
personal computers, tablets, smartphones, cellular phones, video games, the
Internet, e-mail, or GPS-enabled directional devices, technology is a
ubiquitous feature of our daily lives. Access to these technologies has the
capacity to expand our lives and life projects dramatically by enhancing
efficiency and giving us ready and immediate access to information and
people. These technologies are, in short, liberty enhancing. The expansion
of personal and associational liberties offered by modern technologies is not
entirely free, however. To the contrary, as Justice Alito points out, much of
the increased “convenience” and “security” promised by modern
technology comes “at the expense of privacy.”239 Building on contributions
to the privacy law project since Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s
seminal 1890 article,240 Justice Alito and others have elaborated many of
these privacy costs. Their worries are particularly weighty when the
government is the observer.241
Everything we do is subject to digital surveillance. When we visit
websites, we leave traceable footprints that include information about our
Internet service providers (ISPs) and the Internet protocol (IP) addresses
associated with our computers.242 Most websites deposit cookies on our
238 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
239 Id. at 962. Some have argued that this apparent conflict between law enforcement
interests and citizen privacy interests is a “myth.” See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 118, at
38–39. Although important, these arguments actually address another point. Specifically,
they point out that law enforcement interests in digital surveillance, say, are derived directly
from significant citizen privacy and security interests that are best preserved by success in
detecting and prosecuting crimes like identity theft and cyberharassment. This is no doubt
true, but it does not render the conflict moot. Rather, recognizing the citizen interests that
stand behind law enforcement interests adds depth and clarity to the crime-control side of the
Fourth Amendment balancing test. Whether and how far to service those interests still
requires taking account of how much privacy it is reasonable to sacrifice to the “competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
240 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
241 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment); Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 23–27.
242 Although IP addresses are not fixed to our computers, they change less often than was
once the case, and many ISPs have reverted to using permanent or semipermanent IP
addresses for users. As a consequence, tracing Internet activity using IP addresses provides
more information now than it did even a few years ago, when limited bandwidth often
required ISPs to reassign a limited number of IP addresses to users as they logged on and off
the Internet.
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computers that provide information about our activities to site operators,
other websites, and advertisement brokers. Documents sent via networks,
including e-mail and texts, contain a wealth of information, including
metadata with time stamps, location information, and other details about
our activities. Programs and applications we use on our computers and
portable devices record and share locational data, pictures, and other
information about us.
These vast reservoirs of our location data, e-mails, cookies, and the
like are prime targets for cyberharassers who want to control, intimidate,
and terrify victims. Harassers hack into victims’ computers and portable
devices to track their whereabouts. Once inside victims’ computers, they
forward victims’ sensitive e-mails and intimate pictures to their employers
and friends. But, as we shall see, the digital surveillance technologies that
gather information from these sources can also assist the government in its
pursuit and prosecution of cyberharassers. As in Part III, we begin by
briefly describing how digital surveillance implicates a mosaic theory of
Fourth Amendment privacy.
A. DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE MOSAIC THEORY

Most of us have at best a vague sense of what and how much digital
data we generate and share, much less the extent of digital surveillance we
are subjected to by those who gather, aggregate, and analyze that data.
Nevertheless, social networking sites, merchants, and data brokers record
and analyze our digital footprints. Some do so for immediate commercial
gain by, for example, targeting advertisements. Some package the
information into “digital dossiers,” which they sell to government and
private clients.243 Law enforcement and other government officials
routinely contract with these data brokers or directly request or subpoena
information about our online activities from ISPs, e-mail providers, and
search engines.244
Government agencies are also directly involved in digital surveillance.
On an investigative level, federal agents who nobly pursue child
pornographers use a toolkit of devices—including “Wifinders” and
proprietary peer-to-peer software, along with strategies like “wardriving”—
to identify computers that are engaged in distributing child pornography
243 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 2 (2004).
244 Scott Shane and John F. Burns, Twitter Records in Wikileaks Case Are Subpoenaed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A1. For example, Google reports that it received over 8,000
requests for information from agencies in the United States between July and December
2012. Transparency Report: United States, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparency
report/userdatarequests/US/ (last visited May 21, 2013).
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and to find images of child pornography on suspects’ hard drives.245 The
Wall Street Journal recently reported that the National Counterterrorism
Center has been “grant[ed] authority for unprecedented government
surveillance of U.S. citizens” using aggregated data, regardless of whether
targets are suspected of criminal activity.246 As a result of this new
authorization, the Center will have access to most government databases,
potentially including financial information processed through federally
guaranteed mortgage programs and health records for anyone treated at a
federal facility or covered by federal insurance programs, such as Medicare
and Medicaid.247 Perhaps most ominously, a network of fusion centers,
which are operated jointly by law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and
private contractors, and sit at strategic Internet and communications
chokepoints, appear to have realized the vision of the Department of
Defense’s much-maligned Total Information Awareness program.248
This web of digital surveillance is so broad and subtle, in fact, that it
was able to snare former Central Intelligence Agency Director David
Petreaus.249 During the course of an investigation into allegedly harassing
e-mails sent to a Tampa-area event planner, FBI agents used metadata, ISP
information, IP addresses, and, eventually, a warranted electronic search of
an e-mail account, to determine that the suspect mails were sent by
Petraeus’s biographer, Paula Broadwell.250 As a by-product, investigators
also discovered evidence of an extramarital affair between Petraeus and
245 United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 271–72 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v Gorski, 71 M.J. 729, 731–
32 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2012); United States v. Ahrndt, 3:08-CR-00468-KI, 2013 WL
179326, at *1–3 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013); United States v. Broadhurst, 3:11-CR-00121-MO-1,
2012 WL 5985615, at *1–2 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012); United States v. Stanley, Crim. No. 11272, 2012 WL 5512987, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2012); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice,
Lincolnton Man Sentenced to 87 Months in Prison on Child Pornography Charges (Aug. 9,
2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncw/pressreleases/Charlotte-2012-08-09-byrd.html. As
we point out below and elsewhere, we see both the investigative self-constraints and
technological precommitments under which these technologies operate as examples of
precisely where and how agencies, legislatures, and courts should strike the reasonable
balance required by the Fourth Amendment after Jones. See Gray & Citron, supra note 7.
246 Julia Angwin, U.S. Terror Agency to Tap Citizen Files, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012, at
A1.
247 Id.
248 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1443 (2011).
249 Evan Perez et al., FBI Scrutinized on Petraeus—Complaints by Female Social
Planner Led to Email Trail that Undid CIA Chief, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 12, 2012, at A1; Scott
Shane & Charlie Savage, Officials Say F.B.I. Knew of Petraeus Affair in the Summer, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/us-officials-say-petraeussaffair-known-in-summer.html?pagewanted=all.
250 Perez et al., supra note 249; Shane & Savage, supra note 249.
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Broadwell, the revelation of which led Petraeus to resign from his position
at the CIA. Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, noted that this kind of investigation creep is “a
particular problem with cyber investigations [in that] they rapidly become
open-ended because there’s such a huge quantity of information available
and it’s so easily searchable.”251 Commenting on the potential privacy
threats of digital surveillance, Rotenberg pointed out that “[i]f the C.I.A.
director can get caught, it’s pretty much open season on everyone else.”252
As the Wall Street Journal notes, digital surveillance programs like
fusion centers and the initial stages of the probe that led to the discovery of
Petraeus’s affair are outside the scope of Fourth Amendment review
because they involve information that is either exposed to public
observation or voluntarily shared with third parties.253 They are, however,
precisely the sorts of investigative technologies, methods, and techniques
that a mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy would encompass.
They are broad, indiscriminate, capable of almost infinite expansion, and
therefore not subject to the practical constraints that limit more traditional
surveillance techniques.254 They are also surreptitious and therefore
“susceptible to abuse.”255 In short, granting the “Government . . . unfettered
discretion” to engage in digital surveillance threatens to “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.”256
Given the invasive potential of digital surveillance, it is easy to see,
from a citizen privacy point of view, why digital surveillance and other
cyberinvestigative techniques should be subject to Fourth Amendment
regulation. As explained in Part II, however, “regulation” does not mean
prohibition. Rather, limiting law enforcement’s discretion to engage in
digital surveillance will require balancing these Fourth Amendment privacy
concerns against legitimate governmental interests in detecting and
251

Scott Shane, Petraeus Case: Issue of Privacy Is in Play Too, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2012, at A1.
252 Id.
253 Angwin, supra note 246 (stating that the Fourth Amendment “doesn’t cover records
the government creates in the normal course of business with citizens”).
254 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Gray & Citron, supra note 7, at 28–41 (arguing that technology capable
of facilitating broad and indiscriminate surveillance should be subject to Fourth Amendment
regulation).
255 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Susan Freiwald, The
Four Factor Test, USVJONES.COM, http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-four-factor-test/
#more-205 (last visited May 21, 2013) (arguing that the capacity to conduct surreptitious
surveillance is a significant factor in evaluating Fourth Amendment regulation).
256 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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prosecuting crime. In the next section we explore one such area of law
enforcement interest: cyberharassment.
B. THE VALUE OF DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE IN COMBATING
CYBERHARASSMENT

Cyberharassment is a widespread and growing challenge for law
enforcement in the United States. These online attacks feature threats of
violence, privacy invasions, reputation-harming falsehoods, impersonation,
computer hacking, and extortion. They often appear in e-mails, instant
messages, blog entries, message boards, or sites devoted to tormenting
individuals. As the executive director of the National Center for Victims of
Crime explained in her congressional testimony supporting the 2006
cyberstalking amendment to the Violence Against Women Act:
[S]talkers are using very sophisticated technology . . . —installing spyware on your
computer so that they can track all of your interactions on the Internet, your
purchases, your e-mails and so forth, and then using that against you, forwarding emails to people at your job, broadcasting your whereabouts, your purchases, your
reading habits and so on, or installing GPS in your car so that you will show up at the
grocery store, at your local church, wherever and there is the stalker and you can’t
imagine how the stalker knew that you were going to be there. . . . I am happy that
this legislation amends the statute so that prosecutors have more effective tools, I
think, to address technology through VAWA 2005.257

Although some attackers confine their harassment to networked
technologies, others use all available tools to harass victims, including realspace contact. Offline harassment or stalking often includes abusive phone
calls, vandalism, threatening mail, and physical assault.258
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 850,000 adults
experienced stalking with an online component in 2006, including threats in
e-mails, text messages, chat rooms, and blogs.259 Young people are even
more likely to experience some form of cyberharassment. The National
Center for Education Statistics reports that, during the 2008–2009 school
year, 1.5 million young people in the United States were victims of some
form of cyberharassment.260
Already a significant problem,
257

Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 18, 27–28 (2005) (statement of Mary Lou Leary, Executive
Director, National Center for Victims of Crime).
258 WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE, supra note 12.
259 C ITRON , supra note 8 (citing KATRINA BAUM ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2009)).
260 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT REPORTS OF
BULLLYING AND CYBER-BULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2009 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO
THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 1 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2011336.
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cyberharassment is on the rise. College students now report more sexually
harassing speech in online interactions than in face-to-face ones. As the
National Institute of Justice explains, the “ubiquity of the Internet and the
ease with which it allows others unusual access to personal information”
make individuals more accessible and vulnerable to online abuse.261
Harassing someone online is far cheaper and less personally risky than
confronting them in real space.262
Cyberharassment and the identity of its victims follow the well-worn
pathways of bias crimes. The most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics
findings report that 74% of online stalking victims are female.263
Perpetrators are far more likely to be men.264 Unsurprisingly, the content of
these attacks are often sexually explicit and demeaning, drawing
predominantly on gender stereotypes. As one blogger observed, “[t]he fact
is, to be a woman online is to eventually be threatened with rape and death.
On a long enough timeline, the chances of this not occurring drop to

261

Cyberharassment is so easy, in fact, that it has spawned a new breed of social
creature, the troll, who engages in provocative, and sometimes obscene, vitriolic, abusive, or
hateful speech, in order to generate strong emotional responses. Whitney Phillips provides a
useful history of Internet trolls in a recent essay published in The Atlantic online. Whitney
Phillips, What an Academic Who Wrote Her Dissertation on Trolls Thinks of Violentacrez,
THEATLANTIC.COM (Oct. 15, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/10/what-an-academic-who-wrote-her-dissertation-on-trolls-thinks-ofviolentacrez/263631/. As Phillips points out, the phenomenon of Internet trolling is
complicated from a postcritical, sociocultural point of view. After all, many trolls are less
than sincere, either because they are thoughtfully ironic or because they get a base thrill out
of causing offense. Most trolls also keep it impersonal and do not engage in personal or
exploitative attacks. They are the satirists of our age, and play an important role in online
discourse. For some trolls, however, manners, sophistication, empathy, and humility do not
advise such restraint. As Phillips points out, whether the conduct of these trolls masks or
reveals their true opinions is pretty nearly irrelevant. After all, “whether or not the troll
‘really’ hates women, for example, doesn’t matter if the targeted women feel hated.” Id. We
discuss the recent unmasking of one troll, “Violentacrez,” below.
262 Stalking,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/stalking/
welcome.htm (last visited May 21, 2013).
263 CITRON, supra note 8, at 5 (citing BAUM ET AL., supra note 259, at 5). Similarly,
statistics from the National Center for Victims of Crime find that 70% of stalking cases
involve female victims. Id. The U.S. National Violence Against Women Survey reports that
60% of cyberstalking victims are women. Id. (citing Molly M. Ginty, Cyberstalking Turns
Web Technologies into Weapons, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr. 7, 2012, at J1). A University of
Maryland study of online attacks showed that users with female names received on average
100 malicious private messages, which the study defined as “sexually explicit or threatening
language,” for every four received by male users. CITRON, supra note 8, at 5 (citing ROBERT
MEYER AND MICHEL CUKIER, ASSESSING THE ATTACK THREAT DUE TO IRC CHANNELS 467–72
(2006)).
264 Women were more likely to be targeted by men (67%) than women (24%). CITRON,
supra note 8, at 5 (citing BAUM ET AL., supra note 259, at 4).
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zero.”265
Cyberharassment also follows racial lines. A study conducted in 2009
asked 992 undergraduate students about their experience with
cyberharassment. According to this study, nonwhite females faced
cyberharassment more than any other group, with 53% reporting having
been harassed online. Next were white females, with 45% reporting having
been targeted online, with nonwhite males right behind them at 40%. The
group least likely to have been harassed was white males, at 31%.266
Across race, being lesbian, transgender, or bisexual also raised the risk of
being harassed.267
Another disturbing feature of cyberharassment is that it tends to be
perpetrated by groups rather than individuals. Those who engage in abusive
online conduct often move in packs.268 Cyberharassers frequently engage
proxies to help torment their victims.269 These group attacks bear all of the
hallmarks of violent mob behavior. So much so, in fact, that one of us has
dubbed them “cyber mobs.”270 As with sole practitioners, online mob
harassment is more likely to be perpetrated by members of dominant
demographics, and to draw on popular stigmas for the purpose of shaming
and degrading their targets.271
Of course, cold statistics and general description tell at best part of the
story of legitimate government and law enforcement interests in preventing,
detecting, and prosecuting cyberharassment. Recent efforts to highlight the
privacy interests that compel recognition of the mosaic theory of Fourth
Amendment privacy make liberal use of individual stories, in part to pluck

265 Yuki Onna, Let Me Tell You About the Birds and the Bees: Gender and the Fallout
Over Christopher Priest, RULES FOR ANCHORITES: LETTERS FROM PROXIMA THULE (Apr. 6,
2012), http://yuki-onna.livejournal.com/675153.html.
266 Bradford W. Reyns, Being Pursued Online: Extent and Nature of Cyberstalking
Victimization from a Lifestyle/Routine Activities Perspective 96–97 (May 7, 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cinicinnati),
available at
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Reyns%20Bradford%20W.pdf?ucin1273840781.
267 Lisa Stone of BlogHer has observed that the more famous, the more lesbian, and the
more non-white the female blogger, the more vicious the cyberharassment. Lisa Stone,
Hating Hate Speech: Safety for Kathy Sierra and All Women Online, BLOGHER (Mar. 27,
2007, 1:47 AM), http://www.blogher.com/hating-hate-speech-safety-kathy-sierra-and-allwomen-online.
268 CITRON, supra note 8, at 9.
269 PAUL BOCIJ, CYBERSTALKING: HARASSMENT IN THE INTERNET AGE AND HOW TO
PROTECT YOUR FAMILY 67 (2004).
270 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 13, at 104, 113.
271 Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 68, 73 (Saul Levmore & Martha Nussbaum
eds., 2010).
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empathetic strings in the audience.272 In weighing the competing interests
at stake in regulating access to and use of digital surveillance technologies,
it is therefore fair to consider the impact of crimes like cyberharassment in
individual cases.
Take the publicly reported case of D.C. v. R.R.273 D.C. was a high
school student who was actively pursuing a career in the entertainment
industry as a singer and actor.274 He used a pseudonym in his professional
career,275 under which he maintained a fan site that, among other features,
allowed visitors to post comments to a “guestbook.” Several students at
D.C.’s school, who were later identified in a civil suit, engaged in a pattern
of targeted harassment of D.C. by posting comments to his website. Some
were simply offensive—one student told D.C. that he was “the biggest fag
in the [high school] class.”276 Others, however, went much further,
threatening physical and sexual violence in graphic detail. One person
posted on D.C.’s website, “I want to rip out your fucking heart and feed it to
you. . . . If I ever see you I’m . . . going to pound your head in with an ice
pick. Fuck you, you dick-riding penis lover. I hope you burn in hell.”277
Another post told D.C. that he was “now officially wanted dead or alive,”
and a third promised to “unleash my manseed in those golden brown
eyes.”278
According to a California appellate court, the contents of these posts
suggested that “[t]he students . . . sought to destroy D.C.’s life, threatened
to murder him, and wanted to drive him out of [his high school] and the
community in which he lived.”279 In that goal they were successful. On
272

See Tamara Rice Lave, Privacy, Poverty, and People Like Us: Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment after US v Jones (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (arguing that
Fourth Amendment privacy interests only gain traction once a critical mass of citizens on
and off the courts feel that their personal expectations of privacy are threatened).
273 D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Reptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 2010).
274 Id. at 405.
275 Id. at 409.
276 Id. at 412.
277 Id. at 422.
278 Id. at 406.
279 Id. The students who posted to D.C.’s website disputed this conclusion. Despite the
vivid, violent, and homophobic content of his post, one student claimed:
My motivations in sending this email had nothing to do with any perception of [D.C.’s] sexual
orientation, and certainly did not reflect an intention to do him physical harm. As set forth
above, I had no personal knowledge or belief about [D.C.’s] sexual orientation. No one ever told
me he was gay, and I had no thoughts on the subject matter. My message is fanciful, hyperbolic,
jocular, and taunting and was motivated by [D.C.’s] pompous, self aggrandizing, and narcissistic
website—not his sexual orientation. My only other motivation, a bit more pathological, was to
win the one-upmanship contest that was tacitly taking place between the message posters.

Id. at 410 (alterations in original). The California court noted, however, that in cases of
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advice of law enforcement, who consulted the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, D.C. withdrew from his school and moved with his family to
the other end of the state.280 Despite these efforts, the student newspaper at
his former school reported his new location and the name of his new
institution.281 As a consequence of this harassment, D.C. developed a
persistent anxiety disorder.282
Cyberharassment has also spawned a new brand of extortion labeled
“sextortion.”283 This is a form of blackmail in which the extortionist
threatens to publicize images or information that his target might find
embarrassing unless the victim provides sexually explicit pictures and
videos or agrees to participate in live sex shows via Skype or other direct
video communications.284 One infamous perpetrator of sextortion schemes
invaded his targets’ computers using malicious software that allowed him to
mine his victims’ hard drives for compromising images or to capture
images using their own computer cameras.285 He then used those images
and access to his targets’ computers and e-mail accounts to terrorize them
until they agreed to produce sexually explicit pictures or videos for him.
Young people are particularly vulnerable.286 Teenagers who are extorted
into engaging in explicit sex acts under threat and at such a formative stage
of their development are also more likely to suffer scarring emotional and
psychological harm.287 As United States Attorney Joseph Hogsett put the
tortious threats, “[t]he speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.” Id. at 414
(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)).
280 Id. at 406.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 408.
283 See Charles Wilson, Feds: Online ‘Sextortion’ of Teens on the Rise, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2010, 2:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38714259/ns/technology_and_
science-security/t/feds-online-sextortion-teens-rise#.UOpEpm_AeSo (describing the crime
and recounting the facts of several cases).
284 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Maine Resident Charged and Arrested for Allegedly
Engaging in Cyber “Sextortion” of New Hampshire Victim (July 18, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-crm-886.html.
285 Nate Anderson, How an Omniscient Internet “Sextortionist” Ruined the Lives of Teen
Girls, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 7, 2011, 1:02 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/09/
how-an-omniscient-internet-sextortionist-ruined-lives/.
286 Wilson, supra note 283; Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Indiana Man
Charged with Interstate Sextortion of Children (Apr. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/indianapolis/press-releases/2012/indiana-man-charged-with-interstatesextortion-of-children (reporting the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrest of an Indiana
man for using this scheme to extort two fourteen-year-old boys into recording sexually
explicit videos).
287 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf.
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point when commenting on a successful prosecution, “This defendant may
not remember his alleged victims, but the true tragedy is that not one of
them will ever forget.”288
Cyberharassers engage in telephone harassment as well. For example,
in September 2010, Daniel Leonard pleaded guilty to a pattern of
harassment that involved over 4,000 threatening and sexually explicit phone
calls made to over 1,200 phone numbers using an Internet “spoofing”
service that masked his phone number from the call recipients.289 Others go
further still by using the Internet to incite others to rape and stalk victims.
Federal prosecutors recently brought a cyberstalking indictment
against a man who impersonated his ex-girlfriend online over a four-year
period, inciting others to stalk her in person. The man posted online
advertisements with the victim’s contact information and her alleged desire
for sex with strangers. On porn sites, he uploaded videos of her having sex
(which he filmed while they were dating) alongside her contact
information.290 Because strange men began appearing at her home
demanding sex, the woman changed her name and moved to another state.
Her ex-boyfriend discovered her new personal information and again posted
her name, address, and an invitation to have sex on pornography sites next
to her picture. The cycle repeated itself, with strange men coming to her
house at night demanding sex. Although this victim was never physically
assaulted, others are not so lucky.
In December 2009, Ty McDowell broke into the home of a woman in
Casper, Wyoming, tied her up, and raped her. During the course of the

288

Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 286.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Olympia Resident Pleads Guilty to Cyber-Stalking,
Threatening and Obscene Phone Calls Using Internet ‘Spoofing’ Service (Sept. 14, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2010/leonardPlea.
pdf.
290 United States v. Sayer, Crim. Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL
1714746 (D. Me. May 15, 2012); Susan Brenner, Wi-Fi, Curtilage and Kyllo,
CYB3RCRIM3 (June 27, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2012/06/wi-ficurtilage-and-kyllo.html; Judy Harrison, Biddeford Man Sentenced to Five Years in Federal
Prison for Cyberstalking, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012, 3:59 PM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2012/12/04/news/portland/biddeford-man-sentenced-to-fiveyears-in-prison-for-cyberstalking/. Shawn Memarian pleaded guilty to cyberstalking under
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B)(i), admitting that he sent threatening e-mails to the victim and
created fake personal advertisements in which he impersonated the victim, provided her
home address, and claimed her interest in sex after which over thirty men showed up at her
house seeking sex. Report and Recommendation to Accept Defendant’s Guilty Plea, United
States v. Memarian, No. 08-00128-01-CR-W-NKL (W.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2009); News Release,
Office of the U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mo., KC Man Sentenced for Cyberstalking
(June 17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2009/memarian.
sen.htm.
289
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attack, he told her: “You want an aggressive man, bitch, I’ll show you
aggressive.”291 Although McDowell did not know his victim, his crime was
not random. Rather, he had responded to an online advertisement posted on
Craigslist that purported to be from a woman seeking to fulfill her own rape
fantasies. After a lengthy correspondence with the ad’s poster, McDowell
believed that he was fulfilling his victim’s desires.292 He was not. As a
subsequent investigation would reveal, McDowell was in communication
with Jebediah Stipe, who posted the ad and arranged the attack on his exgirlfriend.293 Stipe and McDowell were sentenced to sixty-year prison
terms after pleading guilty to charges of aggravated kidnapping, rape, and
burglary.294
Cyberharassment can also be more general. Sites that encourage
sexualized online abuse are all too common. The website IsAnyoneUp.com
provides a notorious example. For a time, it was one of the most popular
forums on the Internet for “revenge porn,” which entails spurned former
lovers posting sexualized pictures of their ex-wives and ex-girlfriends on a
public forum so that others can leer at and demean them.295 Although
IsAnyoneUp.com eventually shut down amidst protests and outcry, its
operator, Hunter Moore, started a similar site under a different name,
HunterMoore.TV, which may eventually include not only pictures of
women, but also an overlaid map to the homes of those featured in the
pictures.296 Consider too “Violentacrez,” a notorious Reddit administrator
291 Pete Kotz, Jebidiah Stipe Used Craigslist Rape Fantasy Ad to Get Revenge on ExGirlfriend, TRUE CRIME REPORT (Feb. 9, 2010, 11:13 AM), http://www.truecrimereport.com/
2010/02/jebidiah_stipe_used_craigslist.php.
292 DeeDee Correll, Craigslist Implicated in Rape Case; A Wyoming Man is Accused of
Using the Website to Engineer an Ex-Girlfriend’s Assault, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, at A9.
293 Id.
294 Caroline Black, Ex-Marine Jebidiah James Stipe Gets 60 Years for Craigslist Rape
Plot, CBS NEWS (June 29, 2010, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_16220009162-504083.html; William Browning, ‘Terribly Sorry’: Craigslist Rapist Receives
Same Sentence as Man Who Solicited Assault, STAR-TRIBUNE (June 30, 2010, 2:00 AM),
http://trib.com/news/local/terribly-sorry/article_4b04f85a-21a5-54b5-a3a0798aa0b8f2bf.html.
295 Alex Morris, Hunter Moore: The Most Hated Man on the Internet, ROLLING STONE,
Oct. 11, 2012, at 44, 46–48; Camille Dodero, Hunter Moore Makes a Living Screwing You,
VILLAGE VOICE, (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-04-04/news/revengeporn-hunter-moore-is-anyone-up/.
296 Hill, supra note 11; Jessica Roy, Hunter Moore’s ‘Scary as Shit’ Revenge Porn Site
Will Map Submitted Photos to People’s Addresses, N.Y. OBSERVER (Nov. 29, 2012, 8:38
AM), http://betabeat.com/2012/11/hunter-moores-scary-as-shit-revenge-porn-site-will-mapsubmitted-photos-to-peoples-addresses/. Moore later claimed he had been “drunk” during
the interview in which he described the mapping function and would only be posting the
addresses of those who attack him. Tracy Clark-Flory, Hunter Moore: I Lied!, SALON
(Dec. 1, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/12/02/hunter_moore_i_lied/.
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who oversaw forums like “Jailbait,” “Creepshots,” “Rapebait,” “Incest,”
“Beatingwomen,” and “Picsofdeadjailbait,” each of which featured pictures
and commentary from his followers that celebrated the interests described
by the forums’ titles.297
There is, of course, much more to be written about the incidents and
dynamics of cyberharassment crimes. For present purposes, however, the
foregoing is sufficient to show that there are significant and legitimate
governmental interests at stake in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting
various forms of cyberharassment. Although cyberharassment is relatively
new, executives and legislatures have manifested these interests by setting
up dedicated enforcement units and passing tailored criminal statutes.298 As
we argue in the next section, adopting a mosaic theory of the Fourth
Amendment likely will implicate these law enforcement concerns by
limiting access to both existing and future digital surveillance techniques
and technologies.299
C. HOW DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE SERVES GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS IN PREVENTING, DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING
CYBERHARASSMENT

Among the most important methods and strategies used by law
enforcement to track and apprehend those who engage in cyberharassment
and related crimes are: (1) to identify and track the IP addresses associated
with the offending posts and e-mails, (2) to identify and track Media Access
Control (MAC) addresses associated with individual computers used in
perpetrating these offenses, (3) to use proprietary software to identify the
source of images and other files offered through peer-to-peer networks, and
(4) to use data screens that monitor Internet traffic for files containing

297

Adrian Chen, Unmasking Reddit’s Violentacrez, the Biggest Troll on the Web,
GAWKER (Oct. 12, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://gawker.com/5950981/unmasking-redditsviolentacrez-the-biggest-troll-on-the-web; David Fitzpatrick & Drew Griffin, Man Behind
‘Jailbait’ Posts Exposed, Loses Job, CNN (Oct. 19, 2012, 11:20 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/18/us/internet-troll-apology/index.html?hpt=hp_c1.
298 The federal cyberstalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) (2006), and state
cyberharassment laws criminalize patterns of online behavior that are intended to cause, and
do cause, substantial emotional distress. Some states, like New Jersey, have recently passed
video voyeur criminal statutes that prohibit “posting a person’s sexually revealing recordings
or images of victims without their consent if a reasonable person would not have expected to
be observed.” CITRON, supra note 8, at 93. Other statutes include FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 784.048 (West Supp. 2013), IOWA CODE § 708.7(1) (2003 & Supp. 2013), MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 43A (LexisNexis 2010), VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (2009), and S.B.
1411, 2009–10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). CITRON, supra note 8, at n.134.
299 Weinstein, supra note 118, at 39.
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criminal content.300 In this Part, we explain some of the complications that
Jones might present with respect to the use of these technologies to identify
and prosecute cyberharassers.
Computers connected to the Internet have or share IP addresses.
Although the United States has not adopted mandatory data-retention rules
like those promulgated by the European Union, ISPs keep records of IP
addresses assigned to particular computers at specific times. According to
recent reports, major ISPs, such as Verizon and Comcast, generally retain
IP addresses from six months to a year.301 As former Deputy Attorney
General Jason Weinstein reported in testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, these policies
are generous by industry standards, but nevertheless may not be long
enough to serve many or most law enforcement goals.302 Let us
nevertheless suppose that law enforcement obtains the IP addresses
associated with harassing posts within this six-month timeframe. With that
information in hand, officials can usually secure the name and account
information for the user of that IP address from the ISP that assigned it or
from the websites and social networking sites that have been accessed using
the identified IP address.303 If the IP address is permanently or
300 See United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “EP2P” software); United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d
265, 271–72 (1st Cir. 2012) (same); see also United States v Gorski, 71 M.J. 729, 731–32
(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2012); United States v. Ahrndt, 3:08-CR-00468-KI, 2013 WL
179326, at *1–3 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2013); United States v. Broadhurst, 3:11-CR-00121-MO-1,
2012 WL 5985615, at *1–2 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2012); United States v. Stanley, Crim. No. 11272, 2012 WL 5512987, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2012); Press Release, supra, note 245;
Tracking a Troll, BLITZKRIEG BOPP (Sept. 26, 2012), http://evertb.wordpress.com/2012/09/
26/tracking-a-troll/ (describing methods for acquiring and tracking trolls and other posters to
internet forums using IP addresses, including the website http://www.iptrackeronline.com/,
Google, and AOL’s IDP Program).
301 How Long Does Your ISP Store IP-Address Logs?, TORRENTFREAK (June 29, 2012),
http://torrentfreak.com/how-long-does-your-isp-store-ip-address-logs-120629/.
302 Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child Pornography and Other
Internet Crimes: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec., H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 9 (2011) (statement of Jason Weinstein, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division).
303 Nate Anderson, How a Fake Justin Bieber “Sextorted” Hundreds of Girls Through
Facebook, ARS TECHNICA (May 1, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/05/how-a-fake-justin-bieber-sextorted-hundreds-of-girls-through-facebook/
(explaining that police tracked a suspect in a sextortion scheme using his IP address, user
information provided voluntarily by Facebook, and account information from an ISP);
Anderson, supra note 285 (outlining how police employed ISP and IP information to track
and aprehend a sextortionist who used malware to invade and control his targets’
computers); Leo Traynor, The Day I Confronted My Troll, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2012, 4:31
AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/26/day-confronted-troll
(describing how he used IP and ISP information to track and identify the troll who harassed
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semipermanently assigned to a computer, law enforcement can track its
user’s online activities more broadly.
Tracing posters through their computers is not always so
straightforward a task, of course. Harassers can use public computers in
libraries or cafes that do not require registration, limiting traceability
through the IP address. In these cases, however, law enforcement agents
may be able to use Wifinders and other technologies that can identify
individual computers that log onto these open networks by using their MAC
addresses.304 In further efforts to hide their identities, however, harassing
posters can employ free and easy-to-use software like Tor, which
establishes anonymous Internet connections by funneling Web traffic
through encrypted “virtual tunnels.”305 This can make it difficult, if not
impossible, to identify IP addresses connected to harassing conduct. Even
if posters do not try to hide their identities, their computers may share an IP
address with others in a network, which is often the case for universities
and workplaces.306 The IP address would then be of limited help because it
could not identify a specific computer on the network.
Further
complicating matters, some site operators refuse to collect IP addresses
from their subscribers at all.
Despite these complications, tracing an IP address is a common and
effective way for authorities to identify perpetrators of cyberharassment
crimes. At present, the public-observation and third-party doctrines grant
law enforcement unfettered discretion to track IP addresses across the
Internet. Most cyberharassment is, to one degree or another, public.
Furthermore, the third-party doctrine means that law enforcement officers
need a subpoena, at most, to secure user information associated with an IP
address from ISPs and other third parties, including social-networking
sites.307 A mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy might well change
him and his family); Wilson, supra note 283 (reporting a case in which police subpoenaed
ISPs to locate a suspect in sextortion scheme).
304 United States v. Ahrndt, 3:08-CR-00468-KI, 2013 WL 179326, at *3–4 (D. Or. Jan.
17, 2013); United States v. Broadhurst, 3:11-CR-00121-MO-1, 2012 WL 5985615, at *1 (D.
Or. Nov. 28, 2012).
305 Paul Bocij & Leroy McFarlane, Cyberstalking: The Technology of Hate, 76 POLICE J.
204, 210 (2003) (cataloging encryption software and its uses for criminal activity); Tor:
Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited May 21,
2013) (“Tor is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people and groups to improve their
privacy and security on the Internet. . . . To create a private network pathway with Tor, the
user’s software or client incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted connections through
relays on the network.”).
306 David Robinson, CCR Symposium: Practical Aspects of IP Logging, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Apr. 15, 2009, 2:30 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/
ccr_symposium_w.html.
307 People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507–10 (Crim. Ct. 2012).
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all of this. Tracking someone’s online activities using an IP address over a
period of time is akin to tracking a person through physical space using
GPS-enabled tracking devices. By aggregating information about a user
and his online activities, law enforcement officers using these fairly basic
digital surveillance techniques can therefore assemble precisely the sorts of
revealing informational mosaics that worried the concurring Justices in
Jones.
Digital surveillance technology that offends mosaic sensibilities
promises even more benefits than IP traces to law enforcement officers
interested in detecting cybercrimes. Take, for example, forums such as
those organized and moderated by Violentacrez.308 Although under current
law and free speech doctrine it is perfectly legal to view and comment on
pictures of young women in public, law enforcement officers might have
reason to worry that habitués of forums like “Jailbait” and “Creepshots” are
more likely than most to produce or possess actual child pornography. It is,
of course, impossible to conduct even cursory investigations of the tens and
hundreds of thousands of those who visit these sites, much less to
distinguish between casual curiosity seekers and practicing pedophiles.
Here, broad-scale aggregation technology, in combination with ever more
sophisticated data analytics designed to identify and track those patterns of
online conduct that correlate with higher risks of illegal on- and offline
activities, would be tremendously valuable to law enforcement. Once
officers have identified a smaller universe of potential offenders, they can
then further narrow their investigative fields by using passive techniques
like online honey traps to more definitively identify those who are
trafficking in or actively seeking to possess child pornography.309 Again,
although these digital surveillance techniques and technologies are not
presently subject to Fourth Amendment review, either individually or in the
aggregate, the situation would likely change under a mosaic theory. In fact,
officers might find themselves assembling informational mosaics sufficient
to trigger Fourth Amendment concerns quite by accident.310 Regardless,
law enforcement’s legitimate interests in using digital surveillance
technology would be affected.311
Fusion centers also hold significant potential for law enforcement’s
efforts to detect and prosecute cyberharassment. The Department of
Justice, in conjunction with the National Center for Missing and Exploited
308

Fitzpatrick & Griffin, supra note 297.
United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 517–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (recounting an
operation in which the FBI used IP and ISP information to track individuals who attempted
to download child pornography from a website operated by the FBI).
310 Kerr, Mosaic, supra note 19, at 314–19, 337.
311 Weinstein, supra note 118, at 38–39.
309
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Children, maintains a substantial database of known images of child
pornography, each of which has a unique digital fingerprint called a “hash
value.”312 Fusion centers, which have access to most Internet traffic,
provide a unique—although as yet unexploited—resource that law
enforcement agents can use to screen for the transmission of known images
of child exploitation. Outside the relatively narrow field of child
pornography cases, those who engage in cyberharassment and cyberstalking
still tend to use a fairly predictable pattern of words, phrases, and images.
The software used by most malicious stalkers also tends to come from a
stable of online resources, which again bear an identifiable digital signature.
Although the true technical capacities of fusion centers are largely unknown
to the public, they appear to have the ability to monitor Internet and
communications traffic for precisely these sorts of markers. That same
capacity is, of course, precisely what raises concerns about fusion centers
from a mosaic theory point of view. Here again, the prospect of adopting a
mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy raises serious concerns that
the legitimate and important law enforcement goals of detecting and
prosecuting cybercrimes may be compromised.
D. STRIKING A REASONABLE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN PREVENTING,
DETECTING, AND PROSECUTING CYBERHARASSMENT

In reflecting on the challenges for citizens, law enforcement officers,
courts, and policymakers posed by contemporary calls to limit law
enforcement’s use of and access to digital surveillance technology, former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jason Weinstein summed up the stakes:
So, in considering whether to rewrite the standards that govern law enforcement
access to electronic data, policy makers need to consider that choices made out of a
desire to enhance privacy may ultimately reduce it, by making it difficult—and in
some cases impossible—for law enforcement to pursue the criminals who pose a
threat to privacy. More broadly, those choices will have very real consequences for
public safety, as they will significantly reduce the ability of law enforcement to
investigate and prosecute a wide array of serious crimes. 313

It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article to propose specific
compromises. Our purpose is, rather, to outline the competing interests and

312 See Child Victim Identification Program (CVIP), NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING &
EXPLOITED CHILDREN, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?Lan
guageCountry=en_US&PageId=2444 (last visited May 21, 2013); see also Press Release,
Microsoft, New Technology Fights Child Porn by Tracking Its “PhotoDNA” (Dec. 15,
2009), available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/features/2009/dec09/12-15photo
dna.aspx (describing the photo analyzing process and the use of hash values).
313 Weinstein, supra note 118, at 39.
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to give due weight to the legitimate law enforcement goals at issue. As
Judge Posner astutely observed, “[T]he [Fourth] [A]mendment cannot
sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the
twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.”314 With this in mind,
the broad outlines of some potential compromises begin to appear.
First, it is important to keep in mind that the interests of law
enforcement officers in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting online crimes
like cyberharassment and cyberstalking are not antagonistic to the interests
of citizens. Neither are they necessarily antagonistic to privacy interests.
Rather, as Weinstein points out, consistent and efficient detection and
prosecution of these crimes are privacy enhancing, even in the mosaic
sense, in that law enforcement success makes online activities safer (and
hence less invasive of privacy at the hands of harassers), more accessible,
and therefore more useful.315 This does not mean, of course, that law
enforcement officers, engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime,” will not encroach on privacy in the name of preserving
it. As the mosaic theory reminds us, perfect security and perfect privacy are
mutually exclusive. The challenge, therefore, is to strike a reasonable
balance while keeping in mind the fact that law enforcement does not
pursue digital surveillance out of prurient interests or a desire to realize
some Orwellian dystopia. Rather, their interests are our interests.
Second, achieving a reasonable balance between the various interests
at stake in regulating digital surveillance technology under the mosaic
theory is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all affair. In some cases, a warrant
requirement may strike the right balance. In other cases, it may be too
restrictive. In some cases, prior judicial review of a proposed course of
investigation may be required, as is the case now for wiretaps and most
searches of homes. In others, post hoc review following the model in place
now for most arrests in public may provide sufficient protection of Fourth
Amendment rights. Those who design and deploy digital surveillance
technologies may also be able to incorporate internal controls that will limit
use and access to end users, thereby effecting the reasonable balance of
interests required by the Fourth Amendment.316 The ultimate drivers will,
of course, be the interests at stake.
Third, resolving competing interests at stake in a mosaic analysis of
314

United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
Weinstein, supra note 118, at 39.
316 One prominent government contractor, Palantir, has described its efforts to design
software protocols that balance privacy and law enforcement interests in its public
documents. See PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES INC., A CORE COMMITMENT: PROTECTING PRIVACY
& CIVIL LIBERTIES (2012), available at http://www.palantir.com/_ptwp_live_ect0/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/ProtectingPrivacy_CivilLiberties_2012.pdf.
315
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digital surveillance technology will not be a static affair. The fundamental
nature of the home and the techniques available to conduct physical
searches of homes have changed little since 1791. As a consequence, the
solutions developed by courts to contend with physical searches of the
home have been fairly stable over time.317 Digital surveillance is a different
matter. The physical, virtual, and social structures of digital spaces are
rapidly evolving. So too are the scope and nature of our engagements with
digital devices and the intersections between our carbon-constrained and
silicon-dependent lives. As the world changes, our reasonable expectations
of privacy inevitably will change as well. Digital surveillance technologies
are also changing rapidly, providing law enforcement with new tools
capable of aggregating and analyzing more and more data from more and
more sources. Protecting Fourth Amendment rights in this dynamic
environment will require courts, legislators, and law enforcement officials
to find a principled, yet flexible, approach to understanding and balancing
competing interests.318
V. CONCLUSION
The aim of this Article has been to raise questions and issues rather
than to answer them. It has certainly not been our goal to offer a
comprehensive approach to Fourth Amendment cases after United States v.
Jones. Rather, our concern here has been to describe some of the most
important variables that courts and others interested in securing Fourth
Amendment protections under a mosaic theory will need to consider when
striking the balance of competing interests that the Fourth Amendment
requires. In particular, we have emphasized the important and perfectly
legitimate interests of law enforcement officers in using Big Data and
digital surveillance technology to prevent, detect, and prosecute two
increasingly significant classes of cybercrime: healthcare fraud and
cyberharassment. We have also proposed in loose terms a framework that
courts and policymakers might employ as they seek both to accommodate
the needs of law enforcement and to protect citizens’ reasonable
expectations of privacy. Among the most important features of that
framework is an emphasis on context and adaptability. If the Fourth
Amendment is to maintain its role as a bulwark against increasing
governmental surveillance while still allowing law enforcement officers to
pursue new and evolving forms of criminality in a digital age, then
inflexibility and stasis are the true enemies and the surest pathways to
unreasonableness.
317
318

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
In other work, we propose just such an approach. See Gray & Citron, supra note 7.
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